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ARTICLES
THE NYLON CURTAIN: AMERICA'S NATIONAL BORDER
AND THE FREE FLOW OF IDEAS
BURT NEUBORNE* and STEVEN R. SHAPIRO**
When Winston Churchill coined his inspired bit of rhetoric some
forty years ago, he shaped the perceptions of a generation. By
characterizing the Soviet empire as encased in an iron curtain,1
Churchill projected the essence of a closed, totalitarian regime
bent on manipulating its citizens through controlled information
flow; a regime that could never risk the free exchange of informa-
tion, values, and ideals with competing social systems. More than
any other phrase, "iron curtain" has symbolized for many of us in
the postwar West the specter of whole nations turned into prisons,
with national borders acting as walls to keep ideas out and citizens
in.
Like most rhetoric, even Churchill's tended to be one-dimen-
sional, blinding many in the West to the existence of indigenous
popular support for socialist societies premised on values different
from our own, and grossly oversimplifying the problem of our rela-
tionship with the Soviet world. Despite its tendency to oversim-
plify, however, Churchill's equation of national borders with prison
walls has, far too often, been chillingly accurate. National borders
are routinely used as iron curtains in ways that demean the human
spirit,2 whether applied literally to the Berlin Wall or to Soviet
* Legal Director, American Civil Liberties Union; Professor of Law, New York University
School of Law.
** Staff Counsel, New York Civil Liberties Union; Adjunct Professor of Law, Brooklyn
Law School.
The authors have served and are serving as counsel in a number of cases discussed in this
Article. Accordingly, we make no claim to be dispassionate observers. We have attempted,
though, to avoid arguing positions merely because they would be beneficial to our clients.
The material in this article reflects our personal beliefs-partisan as they may be.
1. Sir Winston Churchill first used the phrase "iron curtain" in a speech at Westminster
College in Fulton, Missouri on March 5, 1946.
2. See CouNTRY REPORTS ON HuMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES FOR 1984, REPORT SuBMrrrED TO
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Jewry, or figuratively to foreign book censorship in Poland, travel
bans in Hungary, or the jamming of foreign radio transmissions
throughout the Soviet bloc.
To many of us growing up under Churchillian rhetoric, national
borders as iron curtains were the principal points of differentiation
between "us" and "them." For us, the national border was a signif-
icant concept tied to economic regulation, cultural pride, and per-
sonal security. We would have felt betrayed, however, if our border
were transformed into a physical or ideological barrier. That is why
it is so painful to acknowledge the gradual emergence of America's
national border as a serious barrier to free trade in ideas.
The problem should not be overstated. We do not have a Berlin
Wall. No captive peoples are imprisoned behind our borders. Most
books and periodicals from abroad remain available. But a prob-
lem there is-and a serious one-for a formidable network of regu-
lations and statutes exists that uses our national border to keep
foreign ideas out and American citizens in. Books and periodicals
from presidentially designated "enemy" nations may not be
brought into the United States without a government license.3 Re-
turning travellers from politically suspect locations routinely are
subjected to searches designed to prevent the importation of sub-
versive literature into the United States.4 Visitors from abroad
with suspect political backgrounds may not enter the United
States to give a speech without government permission. 5 Average
Americans cannot travel abroad to visit, and learn about, nations
on the President's enemies list.' Americans can be stripped of their
passports as a punishment for speech deemed "likely" to do seri-
SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE AND HOUSE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS BY THE
DEPARTMENT OF STATE, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. Senate Pt. 99-6 (1984).
3. See Trading With the Enemy Act, § 5(b), 50 U.S.C. app. § 5(b) (1982) and the regula-
tions promulgated thereunder, 31 C.F.R. § 515 (1985) (Cuba); 31 C.F.R. § 500 (1985) (Viet-
nam, North Korea, and Cambodia); see also International Emergency Economic Powers Act,
50 U.S.C. § 1701-1706 (1982).
4. See 19 U.S.C. § 1305 (1982); see also 19 U.S.C. § 1496 (1982); 19 C.F.R. §§ 162.5-
162.22 (1985).
5. See Immigration & Nationality Act of 1952, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1182(a)(27) & (a)(28) (1982); 9
DEPARTMENT OF STATE, FOREIGN AFFAIRS MANUAL (Visa TL-880, 1); 22 C.F.R. § 41.130(c)
(1985); see also 22 U.S.C. § 2691 (1982) (the McGovern Amendment).
6. See Trading With the Enemy Act, § 5(b), 50 U.S.C. app. § 5(b) (1981); 31 C.F.R.
§ 515.560 (1985); see also International Emergency Economic Powers Act, 50 U.S.C. § 1701-
1706 (1982).
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ous damage to our foreign policy.7 Books and films produced
abroad may be branded as "foreign political propaganda" by the
government, and sellers and exhibitors may be forced to report the
identities of purchasers to the government." American academics
may be forbidden to teach foreign students, and to speak about or
publish their scientific research because the government fears the
"export" of their ideas.9 American filmmakers are inhibited from
exporting films depicting America in an unfavorable light if the
government thinks the films may be "misleading" or "subject to
misapprehension" by foreign audiences. 10
A nation that prohibits the importation of foreign books from
"enemy" nations; searches returning travelers for "subversive"
literature; bans foreign speakers on the basis of their politics; re-
stricts the ability of its citizens to travel to hostile nations; silences
dissidents by threatening to deny them the ability to travel abroad;
monitors the identities of persons reading or disseminating "for-
eign propaganda"; forbids its academics from freely speaking
before and teaching to foreigners; inhibits its filmmakers from ex-
porting unflattering material; and deters discussion of forbidden
topics abroad by penalizing the speakers, has turned its border
into an information barrier. That America's border has not become
an iron curtain is a tribute to the strength of our commitment to
intellectual openness and individual freedom. That America's bor-
der has been permitted to evolve into a discernible impediment to
the free flow of ideas is both a warning about the vulnerability of
that commitment and a call to action.
This Article describes the degree to which our border currently
interdicts the flow of information; sketches the inadequate judicial
response to the problem; and suggests an approach that respects
institutional limitations on the judiciary while providing much
7. See Passport Act of 1926, 22 U.S.C. § 211a (1982); 22 C.F.R. § 51.70(b)(4) (1985).
8. See Foreign Agents Registration Acts (FARA), § 4(b), 22 U.S.C. § 611-618 (1982); 28
C.F.R. § 5 (1985).
9. See The Arms Export Control Act, 22 U.S.C. §§ 2751-2796 (1984) (and the regulations
promulgated thereunder, 22 C.F.R. §§ 121-130 (1985)); The Export Administration Act, 50
U.S.C. app. §§ 2401-20 (1982), (and the regulations promulgated thereunder, 15 C.F.R.
§§ 368-399 (1985)).
10. See 19 U.S.C. §§ 2051-2052 (1982); Exec. Order No. 11311, 3 C.F.R. § 593 (1966); 22
C.F.R. §§ 502.1-502.8 (1985).
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needed protection for first amendment values."
I. GOOD FENCES MAKE GOOD NEIGHBORS: THE AMERICAN BORDER
As A RESTRICTION ON THE FREE FLOW OF INFORMATION
A. Limitations on the Ability to Hear Foreign Speakers with
"Suspect" Political Views
The McCarran-Walter Act 2 was enacted in 1952 over President
Truman's veto, despite the President's warning that "seldom has a
bill exhibited the distrust evidenced here of citizens and aliens
alike." Two provisions of the Act are of particular concern to this
Article. 13 Each has been cited by Democrats and Republicans in
support of efforts to exclude foreign speakers from the United
States.
Section 1182(a)(28) explicitly bans the entry of any alien affili-
ated at any time with the Communist Party of the United States,
any other "totalitarian" party of the United States, the Commu-
nist Party of any foreign entity, or "who advocates, [writes or pub-
lishes] the economic, international, and governmental doctrines of
world communism or the establishment in the United States of a
totalitarian dictatorship." 4 If an alien's political beliefs fall within
11. This Article focuses on the courts. By so doing, we do not mean to overlook the vital
role that Congress could and should play in this field. Indeed, the cleanest and most unified
approach to the problems discussed in this Article would be for Congress to repeal the stat-
utory provisions that arguably permit the Executive to restrict the information flow across
the border.
12. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1525 (1982).
13. The Act sets out thirty-three categories of excludable aliens, ranging from relatively
uncontroversial prohibitions on carriers of communicable diseases, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)
(1982), to controversial bans on homosexuals, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(4) (1982), and persons with
suspect political backgrounds, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(28) (1982).
14. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(28) (1982). Section 1182(a)(28)(c) provides for the exclusion of:
Aliens who are members of or affiliated with (i) the Communist Party of the
United States, (ii) any other totalitarian party of the United States, (iii) the
Communist Political association, (iv) the Communist or any other totalitarian
party of any State of the United States, of any foreign state, or of any political
or geographical subdivision of any foreign state, (v) any section, subsidiary,
branch, affiliate, or subdivision of any such association or party, or (vi) the
direct predecessors or successors of any such association or party, regardless of
what name such group or organization may have used, may now bear, or may
hereafter adopt: Provided, That nothing in this paragraph, or in any other pro-
vision of this chapter, shall be construed as declaring that the Communist
Party does not advocate the overthrow of the Government of the United States
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the prohibition on communism or totalitarianism set forth in sec-
tion (a)(28), the Attorney General, acting on the recommendation
of the Secretary of State, may, nevertheless, grant a discretionary
waiver of excludability. 5 From 1952 to 1977, thousands of aliens
each year were found politically excludable under section (a)(28)
and referred to the Attorney General for possible waivers.1 6 Al-
though the vast majority of these aliens eventually obtained waiv-
ers from the Attorney General, the delay and humiliation involved
in the waiver process discouraged some speakers from applying for
American visas and frustrated others who did apply from following
through with their proposed visits. 17 More seriously, numerous
aliens whose political views were particularly disturbing to the gov-
ernment were denied waivers and barred from the country. The
list of those excluded over the past thirty years reads like an intel-
lectual and cultural honor roll, including Pablo Neruda, Carlos
Fuentes, Gabriel Garcia Marquez, Regis Debray, Ernst Mandel,
Dario Fo, and even Pierre Trudeau.8
Disturbed by the divergence between our professed commitment
to the ideals of the Helsinki Accords and our practice of ideological
exclusion, Congress enacted the McGovern Amendment in 1977,
requiring the Secretary of State to recommend a waiver of exclud-
ability for any alien deemed politically excludable under section
(a)(28) unless the Secretary certifies to the Speaker of the House
that the alien's admission would threaten the country's security, as
by force, violence, or other unconstitutional means.
Other subsections of the provision provide, inter alia, for the exclusion of aliens who are
anarchists, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(28)(A) (1982), who advocate or teach "opposition to all organ-
ized government," 8 U.S.C. § (a)(28)(B) (1982); who write or publish material advocating
communism or anarchism, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(28)(G) (1982); or who belong to an organiza-
tion that "writes, circulates, distributes, prints, publishes, or displays" such material, 8
U.S.C. § 1182(a)(28)(H) (1982). Another provision of the law stipulates that an otherwise
ineligible alien may receive a visa if he or she has terminated any prohibited membership
and actively opposed any prohibited doctrines for at least five years. 8 U.S.C.
§ 1182(a)(28)(I) (1982).
15. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(3) (1982).
16. See Exclusion and Deportation Amendments: Hearings on H.R. 4509 and H.R. 5527
Before the Subcommittee on Immigration, Refugees and International Law of the House
Committee on the Judiciary, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 145 (1984) (testimony of Jeri Laber)
(hereinafter Exclusion Hearings).
17. Id. at 145 (testimony of Joan Clark, Assistant Secretary of State for Consular Affairs).
18. For the circumstances surrounding the branding of Trudeau as excludable, see U.S.
Still Blacklists 3,000 Canadians for Politics, N.Y. Times, Feb. 19, 1984, at 21.
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opposed to foreign policy, interests.' The McGovern Amendment
is, admittedly, an odd and ambiguous statute. It uses the word
"should" rather than "shall" in discussing the State Department's
obligations and it contains no direction at all to the Justice De-
partment, which exercises final authority over the waiver process. 20
Nevertheless, experience and intuition both suggest that the Jus-
tice Department understandably is reluctant to overrule a waiver
recommendation by the Secretary of State.21
The political force of the McGovern Amendment clearly has
been recognized by the Reagan Administration, which has largely
eschewed reliance on section (a)(28) to bar foreign speakers. In its
stead, the Reagan Administration increasingly has relied on section
(a)(27) of the McCarran Act, which authorizes the exclusion of
aliens whose "activities" in the United States will be "prejudicial
to the public interest. ' 22 Unlike section (a)(28), an exclusion under
19. The McGovern Amendment is codified at 22 U.S.C. § 2691 (1982) and provides:
For purposes of achieving greater United States compliance with the provisions
of the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe
[signed at Helsinki on August 1, 1975] and for purposes of encouraging other
signatory countries to comply with those provisions, the Secretary of State
should, within 30 days of receiving an application for a nonimmigrant visa by
any alien who is excludable from the United States by reason of membership
in or affiliation with a proscribed organization but who is otherwise admissible
to the United States, recommend that the Attorney General grant the approval
necessary for the issuance of a visa to such alien, unless the Secretary deter-
mines that the admission of such alien would be contrary to the security inter-
ests of the United States and so certifies to the Speaker of the House of Rela-
tions of the Senate. Nothing in this section may be construed as authorizing or
requiring the admission to the United States of any alien who is excludable for
reasons other than membership in or affiliation with a proscribed organization.
The government has suggested that the use of the phrase "should" in the McGovern
Amendment renders it wholly precatory. No court has construed the phrase.
20. Id.
21. A letter dated October 18, 1983, from Alvin Paul Drischler, Acting Assistant Secretary
of State for Legislative and Intergovernmental Affairs, to Vice President Bush in his capac-
ity as President to the Senate, recommended amendment of the McGovern Amendment to
permit the Secretary of State to consider foreign policy factors under section (a)(28) because
the Attorney General does not feel qualified to do so. A copy of the Drischler letter has been
filed with the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit as Exhibit
B to the Brief of Appellants in Abourezk v. Reagan, 592 F. Supp. 880 (D.D.C. 1984) (appeal
docketed, No. 84-5673, D.C. Cir. Oct. 16, 1984).
22. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(27) (1982). Section 1182(a)(27) provides for the exclusion of,
[a]liens who the consular officer or the Attorney General knows or has reason
to believe seek to enter the United States solely, principally, or incidentally to
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section (a)(27) cannot be waived by the Attorney General and is,
therefore, outside the reach of the McGovern Amendment's limita-
tion on the refusal to grant waivers.2 3
The first indication of the administration's change of strategy
occurred when Hortensia Allende, widow of the late President of
Chile, was denied permission to travel from her home in Mexico
City to San Francisco to deliver a speech on the role of women in
Latin American society at the invitation of, among others, the
Archdiocese of San Francisco and Stanford University.24 Initially,
the government invoked section (a)(28), claiming that Mrs. Al-
lende's role as an official of the World Peace Council made her an
officer of a communist front organization and, thus, ineligible for
an entry visa. When it became clear that the McGovern Amend-
ment would require the Secretary of State to recommend a waiver
of excludability because Mrs. Allende could not conceivably be
deemed a threat to national security, the government changed the-
ories and denied her an entry visa under section (a)(27), claiming
her presence in the United States to give a speech would be preju-
dicial to the public interest.2 5
In the years following the exclusion of Mrs. Allende, the govern-
ment repeatedly has used section (a)(27) as the basis for excluding
speakers with whom it disagrees. For example, in 1983, General
Nino Pasti, who had served as a Vice Air Marshal of NATO and as
engage in activities which would be prejudicial the public interest, or endanger
the welfare, safety, or security of the United States.
Prior to the enactment of the McGovern Amendment, section (a)(27) was invoked rarely
to exclude aliens because of their ideas or political views. From 1963 to 1982, section (a)(27)
was invoked a total of 519 times. The bulk of the exclusions appear to have had no connec-
tion with the ideological status of the proposed speaker. See Exclusion Hearings, supra note
16, at 90 (statement of Joan Clark, Assistant Secretary of State for Consular Affairs).
The government has conceded that section (a)(27) was invoked b~cause of the ideological
status of an alien speaker: in 1959, to deny admission to Otto Skorzeny; in 1958, 1961, and
1962 to deny admission to a Formosan dissident, Thomas Liao; in 1964 to deny admission to
Mine. Ngo Dinh Nhu; and in 1975 to deny admission to several Rhodesian citizens. See
Brief for the Appellees at 54-55, Abourezk v. Reagan, No. 84-5673 (D.C. Cir. Oct. 16, 1984);
see also 1 Op. Off. Legal Counsel 64 (April 1977) (asserting power to exclude aliens under
section (a)(27) for "foreign policy" reasons).
23. The waiver provisions of 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(3) explicitly exclude aliens who have
been denied admission under section (a)(27), section (a)(29) (dealing with espionage or vio-
lent overthrow), or section (a)(33) (dealing with former Nazi officials guilty of persecution).
24. See generally Allende v. Shultz, No. 83-3984-C (D. Mass. April 2, 1985).
25. Id. at 2-3.
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the ranking Italian Air Force officer in both NATO and the Penta-
gon, was invited to visit the United States to deliver a series of
speeches highly critical of the deployment of American cruise mis-
siles in Western Europe.2" General Pasti accepted the invitation
but was unable to secure permission to enter the United States to
speak.17 As with Mrs. Allende, the American government suggested
that General Pasti's association with the World Peace Council dis-
abled him from receiving a visa under section (a)(28), but failed to
invoke section (a)(28) because it would, in all likelihood, have re-
sulted in General Pasti's eventual admission under the McGovern
Amendment. Instead, the government relied on section (a)(27) and
barred General Pasti from entering the country.28
Similarly, in 1983, the New York City Commission on the Status
of Women decided to hold hearings on the state of the family. The
Commission invited two well-known Cuban specialists in juvenile
and family law, Maria Lezcano and Olga Finlay, to testify in New
York City about the status of the family in Cuba and Cuban re-
sponses to the problem of juvenile delinquency. 9 As with Mrs. Al-
lende and General Pasti, the government invoked section (a)(27)
26. Cronin v. Shultz, appeal docketed, No. 84-5708 (D.C. Cir. Oct. 16, 1984).
27. Id. (declaration of Nino Pasti, filed in Cronin). General Pasti's declaration recites that
he was a four star general in the Italian Air Force; that from 1963-1966 he was stationed at
the Pentagon, and that in 1966 he became Vice-Supreme Commander of NATO for Nuclear
Affairs. After his mandatory retirement from the military at age 65, General Pasti served
from 1976-1983 as a member of the Italian Senate, elected as a Left Independent. He cur-
rently edits a monthly magazine, Lotte per la Pace et il Disarme (Struggle for Peace and
Disarmament).
28. Prior to the refusal to permit him to speak in 1983, General Pasti routinely had re-
ceived entry visas on at least five occasions. Id.
29. See City of New York v. Shultz, appeal docketed, No. 84-5681 (D.C. Cir. Sept. 28,
1984).
The New York City Commission on the Status of Women was established by New York
City in 1975. Its function is to conduct research and investigation into the status of women
for the purpose of recommending institutional change.
On September 7, 1983, the Commission invited Olga Finlay and Leonor Rodriguez Lez-
cano to discuss day care and other Cuban mechanisms supportive of women. See id. (affida-
vit of Marilyn Flood).
Ms. Finlay is a lawyer who has represented the Federation of Cuban Women before inter-
national organizations since 1980. In 1979, she was the Cuban delegate to UNICEF's Inter-
national Year of the Child. In 1977, she was the Cuban representative to the United Nations
Commission on the Status of Women. She lived in the United States for fifteen years as a
child, before returning to Cuba in 1961. Id. (declaration of Olga Finlay). Ms. Lezcano is an
expert on the status of black women in Cuba. Id. (declaration of Leonor Lezcano).
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and denied visas to both speakers, announcing that it would be
prejudicial to the public interest to permit the two Cuban women
to enter the United States in order to speak.30
When a representative of Cornell University protested the gov-
ernment's refusal to permit Ms. Lezcano and Ms. Finlay to speak
in connection with Cornell's Latin American Studies Program, the
State Department candidly responded that the visas were denied
because a speaking tour "would have been prejudicial to the public
interest by providing these two officials with forums for propagat-
ing Cuban policies before United States audiences. '31 Indeed,
shortly thereafter, Ms. Finlay was granted a visa to attend a meet-
ing of the Pan American Health Organization in Washington, D.C.,
on condition that she not leave that city or speak to any American
groups.32
Still another example of the use of the visa power as a device to
license foreign speakers occurred in 1983 when a number of Ameri-
can lawyers and academics invited Tomas Borge, Nicaragua's Inte-
rior Minister, to visit the United States to discuss Nicaraguan poli-
cies. 33 Despite having told Mr. Borge several months earlier that he
would be welcome in the United States, the State Department de-
clined to grant his application for a visa.3 4 No official reason was
ever given for barring Mr. Borge from his speaking tour. In a re-
30. Id. (affidavit of then Assistant Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger); id. (affidavit
of Louis Goelz).
31. Id. (letter of Kenneth W. Skoug, Jr. to Thomas H. Holloway attached to declaration
of Thomas H. Holloway).
32. Id. (declaration of Olga Finlay). In addition to the shifting fortunes of Ms. Finlay's
visa requests, the experience of Dario Fo, one of Italy's leading dramatists, further illus-
trates the arbitrary and capricious nature of the ideological exclusion process. Fo was twice
denied an American visa for political reasons in the early 1980's. These visa denials were
explained by a government official in the following terms. "Nobody in [the] State [Depart-
ment] thinks Fo is going to throw bombs .... [I]ts just that Dario Fo has never had a good
word to say about the United States." Munk, Cross Left, The Village Voice, June 2, 1980, at
86.
Fo applied once again in September 1984, hoping to be present for the Broadway rehears-
als and premiere of his play, "Inquiry into the Accidental Death of an Anarchist." This last
application was granted with no explanation or attempt to distinguish his earlier unsuccess-
ful requests. Gussow, U.S. to Give Visa to Fo, Controversial Writer, N.Y. Times, Oct. 31,
1984, at C19.
33. See Abourezk v. Reagan, 592 F. Supp. 880 (D.D.C. 1984) (appeal docketed, No. 84-
5673, D.C. Cir. Sept. 28, 1984).
34. Id. (declaration of Thomas Borge).
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vealing comment on the denial, however, Secretary of State Shultz
observed that free speech "can get abused by people who do not
wish us well.""3 Similarly, an unidentified White House source ex-
plained the denial by saying that "the government did not want to
give Mr. Borge a propaganda platform in the United States.13 In
short, under a combination of sections (a)(27) and (a)(28), Ameri-
cans hear only those foreign speakers whom the government
chooses to permit them to hear.37
B. Limitations on the Importation of Foreign Books and Periodi-
cals from "Enemy" Countries
In 1917, Congress enacted the Trading With the Enemy Act
(TWEA) to permit the President to control wartime trade with
Germany and the Austro-Hungarian Empire, and to facilitate the
resumption of normal trading patterns after World War I.38 In
1933, the Act was expanded to cover peacetime national emergen-
cies. 9 In 1942, President Roosevelt reimposed restrictions on trad-
ing with our wartime enemies and delegated his powers under the
TWEA to the Secretary of the Treasury.40 In 1950, President Tru-
35. Washington Post, December 3, 1983, at A12.
36. N.Y. Times, November 30, 1983, at All.
37. Additional examples of the government's use of the visa power as a censorship tech-
nique include the refusal to permit the recipients of the Robert F. Kennedy Foundation's
first annual human rights award to enter the country to receive the award. The RFK Foun-
dation had elected to give its first award to Salvadoran mothers whose children are missing
and presumed executed by the current regime. Washington Post, Nov. 21, 1984, at Dl.
Shortly thereafter, Roberto D'Aubuisson, a Salvadoran politician publicly linked to death
squads and a plot to assassinate the American Ambassador was granted a visa. N.Y. Times,
Dec. 4, 1984, at A9, col. 1. Similarly, the government selectively granted visas to persons
invited to a debate on El Salvador organized by the Center for Democratic Institutions and
broadcast nationwide so as to exclude Ruben Zamora, chief political spokesman for the in-
surgents. N.Y. Times, November 20, 1984, at A22, cols. 1-2.
38. Act of Oct. 6, 1917, ch. 106, 40 Stat. 411 (1917). 50 U.S.C. app. 5(b) (1982). The pur-
poses of the Trading With the Enemy Act were set forth in congressional colloquy which is
reproduced in COMMITTEE PRINT OF THE HousE SUBCOMMITTEE OF INT'L TRADE AND COM-
MERCE OF THE COMMITTEE ON INT'L RELATIONS: TRADING WITH THE ENEMY: LEGISLATIVE AND
EXEcUTIVE DOCUMENTS CONCERNING REGULATION OF INTERNATIONAL TRANSACTIONS IN TIME
OF DECLARED NATIONAL EMERGENCY, 47-48, 81, 158-60, 179, 94 Cong., 2d Sess. (1976).
39. Act of March 9, 1933, ch. 1, 48 Stat. 1 (1933).
40. Exec. Order No. 9193, 3 C.F.R. 1174, 1175 (1942). President Roosevelt exempted $500
per month from the embargo for living and travelling expenses within any foreign country.
General License No. 33, pursuant to Exec. Order No. 8389, 3 C.F.R. 645 (1940) (Sept. 10,
1940, amended, Oct. 23, 1941); see 28 FED. RES. BULL. 1088 (1942). The TWEA was not used
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man declared a national emergency on the eve of the Korean War
that empowered him under the TWEA to regulate trade with
China and North Korea as designated "enemy" nations, and then
delegated authority to administer the Act to the Director of the
Office of Foreign Assets Control.
41
President Truman's declaration of national emergency was never
rescinded despite the end of the Korean War in 1953. As a result,
the temporary trade restrictions authorized by the TWEA were
transformed into a permanent fixture of postwar American life.42
Congress finally responded in 1977 by restricting the president's
peacetime power to impose unilateral trading restrictions pursuant
to the TWEA.43 At the same time, Congress grandfathered all ex-
ercises of regulatory authority in force as of July 1, 1977.1" Because
of the grandfather provision, draconian restrictions on trade with
Cuba, North Korea, Vietnam, and Cambodia remain in effect, in-
cluding bans on the purchase of books, films, and periodicals pro-
duced in these "enemy" countries.
Under regulations issued by the Office of Foreign Asset Control,
covering North Korea, Vietnam, and Cambodia,45 and parallel reg-
to control personal travel during World War II. 7 Fed. Reg. 1409 (1942); Exec. Order No.
9193 (July 6, 1942); see also Treas. Dept. Order No. 120, Dec. 19, 1950, as amended, 32 Fed.
Reg. 3472.
41. Presidential Declaration, Dec. 16, 1950; see also Treas. Dept. Order 128 (Oct. 15,
1962) (Cuba).
42. Proclamation No. 3004, 67 Stat. C31, (Jan. 17, 1953); see also Exec. Order No. 10896,
3 C.F.R. 425 (1960); Exec. Order No. 11037, 3 C.F.R. 621 (1962); Exec. Order No. 11387, 33
Fed. Reg. 47 (1967). Presidential ability to assume extraordinary power based on a declara-
tion of national emergency is now regulated under the National Emergencies Act, Pub. L.
No. 94-412, 90 Stat. 1255, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1651 (1982).
43. 50 U.S.C. § 1601(a) (1982); see also, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1701-06 (1982). At the same time
that Congress restricted the President's power under the TWEA, it authorized the president
to impose trade restrictions under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act, 50
U.S.C. § 1701-1706 (1982), but made the exercise of those powers subject to a congressional
veto. See infra note 72.
44. Pub. Law 95-223, 91 Stat. 1625 (1977). Pursuant to the grandfather clause, the Presi-
dent may continue exercising "authorities" in effect on July 1, 1977 on a year-to-year basis
if he finds the restrictions to be in the national interest.
If a grandfathered "authority" lapses, it cannot be unilaterally reimposed by the Presi-
dent. 50 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1706 (1982). The scope of the grandfather clause was broadly con-
strued in Reagan v. Wald, 104 S. Ct. 3026 (1984), to include the reimposition of restrictions
not actually in effect on July 1, 1977, so long as some restrictions affecting the country in
question were in place on that date.
45. 31 C.F.R. § 500.204 (1985).
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ulations issued by the Office of Cuban Asset Control,4e books and
magazines from such "enemy" nations may not be brought into the
United States in the absence of a special import license issued by
the Treasury Department. To obtain a license, an applicant must
persuade the Treasury Department that the books are gifts which
will not economically benefit the "enemy" nations or, alternatively,
that payment for the books has been made into a blocked ac-
count.47 Without a license, no American may buy books or periodi-
cals from a nation on the President's "enemies list.' '48
This licensing authority has been used in the past, and may be
used in the future, to block the importation of books and
magazines from designated foreign nations. On several occasions
during the 1960's, for example, customs officials seized packages
containing English language books and newspapers produced in
North Vietnam and China and refused to permit them into the
United States until the addressees obtained import licenses from
the Treasury Department.49 Attempts to obtain licenses were met
with intrusive questionnaires and processing delays of up to eight
weeks. Efforts to obtain judicial relief from these restrictions were
largely unsuccessful.50 Thus, at the height of the national debate
over the Vietnam War, access to books, newspapers, magazines and
films produced in North Vietnam and China was virtually cut off.
No mechanism existed to permit an American to subscribe to a
North Vietnamese newspaper, to buy a Chinese book, or to import
46. 31 C.F.R. § 515.101-515.809 (1985).
47. 31 C.F.R. § 515.544 (1985) (Cuba); 31 C.F.R. § 500.204 (1985) (North Korea, Viet-
nam, Cambodia). By contrast, the recent trade embargo imposed against Nicaragua, infra
note 202, includes a general license for the importation of books and magazines. Nicaraguan
Trade Control Regulations, 50 Fed. Reg. 19890 (1985) (to be codified at 31 C.F.R. 540.100-
809 (1985)).
48. Under existing regulations, otherwise forbidden books or magazines can be purchased
by recognized educational or research institutions if the materials are approved by the Li-
brary of Congress or the National Science Foundation. In addition, "scholars" returning to
the United States from approved trips abroad may bring back research material. 31 C.F.R.
§ 515.545(a)(1)(2) (1985). Newsgathering organizations also are permitted to purchase items
for domestic news publication or broadcast. 31 C.F.R. § 515.546 (1985).
49. See, e.g., Teague v. Regional Comm'r of Customs, 404 F.2d 441 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
394 U.S. 977 (1968) (Black, Douglas, and Harlan, JJ., dissenting from denial of certiorari);
Veterans & Reservists for Peace v. Regional Comm'r of Customs, 459 F.2d 676 (3rd Cir.),
cert. denied, 409 U.S. 933 (1972).
50. See supra note 49.
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a film produced in either country. Even when material was for-
warded from North Vietnam or China without charge, addressees
were obliged to identify themselves to the government as wishing
to receive the "enemy" material, to persuade the Treasury Depart-
ment that no financial benefit was accruing to the "enemy" nation,
and to undergo a long waiting period before delivery.
51
Recently, Americans seeking to import periodicals from Cuba
have encountered similar difficulties. In May 1981, the Reagan Ad-
ministration directed customs officials and postal authorities to
seize thousands of Cuban publications en route to American read-
ers pending receipt of Treasury Department import licenses for
each item.2 Until then, trade regulations applicable to Cuba had
not been enforced against Americans wishing to import Cuban
books and magazines for personal use.53
Faced with a repeat of the Vietnamese and Chinese book-ban-
ning that had taken place in the late 1960's, over one hundred sub-
scribers to Cuban books and periodicals sought judicial assis-
tance.5 4 One day before the government's answer was due, the
Customs Service released single copies of books and magazines to
addressees without a special license, thus mooting the case.5
51. Teague, 404 F.2d at 444 n.5; Veterans and Reservists for Peace, 450 F.2d at 682.
52. The Treasury notification sent to each addressee stated:
You are the addressee of a mail shipment containing publications from Cuba.
This mail has been detained by the United States Customs Service because its
unlicensed importation is prohibited by the Cuban Assets control regulations
(31 C.F.R. Part 515).
This office may not release this merchandise to you unless you present to us,
together with this notice, either in person or by mail
A Foreign Assets Control License.
Applications for these licenses may be obtained from:
Office of Foreign Assets Control
1331 G Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20020
Tel: 202-376-0408
53. The government has maintained records on persons recovering books and magazines
from Cuba since 1962. See Declaration of Dennis M. O'Connell, Director, Treasury Dept. of
Foreign Asset Control, submitted in The Nation v. Haig, No. 81-2988-MA (D. Mass Feb. 12,
1980).
54. The Nation v. Haig, No. 81-2988-MA (D. Mass. Feb. 12, 1980).
55. The Treasury Department instructions concerning single copies are contained in
Treasury Memorandum, FAC No. 95111, 1111, which states:
A. Single Copy Imports
U.S. Customs Service is authorized to release to the addressee, whether an
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The fragile truce on book and newspaper imports established in
1982 appears to be holding. Single copies of books and magazines
are currently permitted into this country from Cuba, Cambodia,
North Korea, or Vietnam without a special license.5 6 A member of
the general public may not, however, receive more than one copy
of a book or newspaper from an "enemy" country unless he or she
persuades the Treasury Department that the books are a gift.57
In addition to the TWEA, government officials have invoked 19
U.S.C. section 130558 to search the personal effects of returning
travellers for subversive literature or obscene material.59 Unlike
individual, an institution or other organization, single copies of any Cuban,
Vietnamese, North Korean or Cambodian publications. For purposes of this
notice, the term "publications" include books, newspapers, magazines films,
phonographs records, tapes, photographs, microfilm, microfiche, posters and
similar materials.
56. See 31 C.F.R. § 515.545 (1985).
57. 31 C.F.R. § 515.544 (1985) (Cuba); 31 C.F.R. § 500.204 (1985) (North Korea, Viet-
nam, and Cambodia).
Ironically, the administration is pursuing an aggressive policy designed to pump American
ideas into Cuba. See Exec. Order 12323, 46 Fed. Reg. 47207 (1981) (establishing Presidential
Commission on Broadcasting to Cuba).
58. 19 U.S.C. § 1305 (1982) provides, in pertinent part:
All persons are prohibited from importing into the United States from any
foreign country any book, pamphlet, paper, writing, advertisement, circular,
print, picture, or drawing containing any matter advocating or urging treason
or insurrection against the United States or forcible resistance to any law of
the United States, or containing any threat to take the life of or inflict bodily
harm upon any person in the United States, or any obscene book, pamphlet,
paper, writing, advertisement, circular, print, picture, drawing, or other repre-
sentation, figure, or image on or of paper or other material .... No such arti-
cles whether imported separately or contained in packages with other goods
entitled to entry, shall be admitted to entry; and all such articles ... shall be
subject to seizure and forfeiture as hereinafter provided: Provided . . . That
the Secretary of the Treasury may, in his discretion, admit the so-called clas-
sics or books of recognized and established literary or scientific merit, but may,
in his discretion, admit such classics or books only when imported for noncom-
mercial purposes.
Upon the appearance of any such book or matter at any customs office, the
same shall be seized and held by the appropriate customs officer to await the
judgment of the district court as hereinafter provided.
59. For examples of the harrassment of journalists returning from trips to "enemy" coun-
tries and the seizure of their books and periodicals see Haase v. Webster, 608 F. Supp. 1227
(D.D.C. 1985) (dismissed as moot upon deposit of seized material with the court), and Wor-
thy v. Webster, No. 82-0183 (D.D.C., stipulation entered Dec. 10, 1982) (settled for $16,000,
return of all seized material, and destruction of all records).
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the TWEA, section 1305 attempts to distinguish between protected
and unprotected material, and to exclude only material which falls
outside the protection of the first amendment. In practice, the
statute has served as an invitation to overzealous border officials
anxious to seize books and newspapers that appear unfriendly to
the United States.60 When such improper action is challenged in
court, the government has generally settled and returned the
seized materials, occasionally paying damages.6 1 But, thus far, no
attempt has been made to issue regulations preventing the routine
violation of first and fourth amendment rights by border officials
bent on preventing subversive books from entering the country.62
C. Limitations on Travel to "Enemy" Countries
Government restrictions on travel abroad have a long and unfor-
tunate history in this country. At times, the government has at-
tempted to block specific individuals from travelling abroad be-
cause of their political beliefs.6e At other times, the government
has barred all Americans from travelling to designated parts of the
world for ideological reasons.6 4
60. See supra note 59.
61. See Worthy v. Webster, No. 82-0183 (D.D.C., stipulation entered Dec. 10, 1982).
62. Despite the emergence of clear Supreme Court precedent governing seizure of mate-
rial putatively protected by the first amendment, neither regulations nor judicial decisions
exert control over the discretion of customs agents. Compare Marcus v. Search Warrant, 367
U.S. 717 (1961) and A Quantity of Books v. Kansas, 378 U.S. 205 (1964) with Worthy v.
Webster, No. 82-0183 (D.D.C., stipulation entered Dec. 10, 1982).
In addition to section 1305 seizures, the National Security Agency routinely intercepts all
overseas telephone calls and "its computers then store the mass of acquired communications
to select those which may be of specific foreign intelligence interest." Halkin v. Helms, 598
F.2d 1, 4 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
63. See supra notes 16-18 and accompanying text. State-imposed restrictions on the abil-
ity of individuals to travel outside their native land have rightly been perceived and con-
demned as an indicia of totalitarianism in the modem world. See COMMISSION ON SECURITY
AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE, IMPLEMENTATION OF THE FINAL ACT OF THE CONFERENCE ON
SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE: FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS Two YEARS AFTER
HELSINKI, REPORT TRANSMITTED TO THE HOUSE COMM. ON INT'L RELATIONS, 95th Cong., 1st
Sess. 91 (1977).
The Helsinki Accords, formally named The Final Act of the Conference on Security and
Cooperation in Europe, were signed on August 1, 1975. 3 DEPT. STATE BULL. 323 (1975),
reprinted in 14 INTERNATIONAL LEGAL MATERIALS 1292 (1975). The Helsinki Accords are not
a treaty. They are declarations of intention to conform to commonly endorsed human rights
practices.
64. For discussions of attempts to limit the ability of Americans to travel abroad, see, for
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Before World War I, an informal system of area travel restric-
tions evolved under the Passport Act of 1856, which delegated
power to grant passports to the Secretary of State.6 5 Under the
pressures of World War I, Congress enacted the first explicit travel
control statute, which forbade travel without a valid passport.66
With the lapse of the wartime legislation, travel restrictions were
enforced through sporadic attempts to impose geographical limits
on the use of American passports67 and attempts to ban American
communists from travelling abroad.68
Controversy over the degree to which passport area limitations
could be used to enforce travel restrictions led in 1978 to the pas-
sage of legislation stripping the Executive of the power to impose
area restrictions on travel except during war, armed hostilities, or
imminent danger to the public health. One year earlier, President
Carter had removed all travel restrictions to Cuba in compliance
with the Helsinki Accords.70 Unfortunately, this brief period of un-
restricted travel lasted only a short while.
In 1982, President Reagan promulgated new regulations under
the TWEA, which treat travel-related personal expenditures for
food and lodging as prohibited economic transactions requiring a
Treasury Department license.7 1 Thus, while the Executive is for-
bidden by law from unilaterally imposing direct area restrictions
on travel to nations on the "enemies" list,7 2 it has unilaterally for-
example, Velvel, Geographical Restrictions on Travel: The Real World and the First
Amendment, 15 U. KAN. L. REV. 35 (1966); Note, Area Restrictions and the Right to Travel
Abroad, 81 COLUM. L. Rlv. 902 (1981); Note, Travel and the First Amendment: Zemel v.
Rusk, 13 U.C.LA L. REV. 740 (1966); see also ASSoCIATION OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF NEW
YORK. FREEDOM TO TRAvEL (1958). For an early discussion of the problem, see Riesman,
Legislative Restrictions on Foreign Enlistment and Travel, 40 COLUM. L. REv. 793 (1940).
65. 11 Stat. 60 (1856); see U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, THE AMERICAN PASSPORT, 36-42 (1898).
66. Act of May 22, 1918, ch. 81, §§ 1-2, 40 Stat. 559 (1918).
67. See, e.g., DEPARTMENT OF STATE, PASSPORT RESTEiCTIONS ON TRAVEL TO CERTAIN AREAS
(April 25, 1966).
68. See United States v. Laub, 385 U.S. 475 (1967); Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378
U.S. 500 (1964); Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116 (1958).
69. Pub. L. No. 95-426, § 124, 92 Stat. 971 (1978) (codified at 22 U.S.C. § 211a (1982)
(often cited as the Passport Act of 1978)).
70. President's News Conference of March 9, 1977, 13 WEEKLY CoMP. PRES. Doc. 328-29
(March 14, 1977).
71. 31 C.F.R. § 515.560 (1985); see 47 Fed. Reg. 32060 (1982) (codified at 31 C.F.R.
§ 515.5600) (1985)).
72. Under current law, area travel restrictions may be imposed only with the acquiescence
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bidden travellers to buy food or pay for lodging while in the pro-
scribed countries. The existing regulations permit recognized
scholars and professionals to visit these countries,7 3 and travellers
may accept the hospitality of free overseas trips.7 4 In general, how-
ever, Americans interested in learning more about Cuba, North
Korea, Vietnam, or Cambodia, may not spend any money on their
foreign travels without risking the prospect of ten years in jail.h
D. Limitations on the Dissemination of Foreign Political
Propaganda
The TWEA imposes a flat ban on the unlicensed importation of
books and newspapers from designated "enemy" countries. The
Foreign Agents Registration Act 7 6 (FARA) imposes burdensome re-
strictions on the dissemination of many foreign books, films, and
periodicals that escape the TWEA ban.
Enacted in 1938 by a Congress concerned over the spread of
Nazi-sponsored propaganda in the United States,7 FARA was
amended in 1942 to require persons acting as agents of a foreign
principal, whether government or private, to report each dissemi-
nation of political material in the interest of a foreign principal to
the Internal Security Division of the Justice Department; to label
the disseminated material as foreign political propaganda; and to
file with the Department of Justice the names of persons and orga-
of Congress pursuant to the International Emergency Economic Powers Act, Pub. L. 95-223,
50 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1706 (1982) (often cited as IEEPA). President Carter invoked IEEPA to
ban all travel to Iran during the Iranian hostage crisis. Exec. Order No. 12211, 45 Fed. Reg.
26685 (1980); 45 Fed. Reg. 29287 (adding 31 C.F.R. § 535.428 (1985)).
For a discussion of the legality of former Attorney General Ramsey Clark's unsponsored
visit to Teheran in an attempt to negotiate a release of the hostages, see N.Y. Times, June
12, 1980, at 12. No action was taken against him.
No case has yet considered the impact of Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. Chadha,
454 U.S. 1077 (1983), on IEEPA's grant of power to Congress to terminate an area travel
ban by joint resolution of Congress.
73. 31 C.F.R. § 515.560 (1985).
74. 31 C.F.R. § 515.560(j) (1985).
75. Willful violation of any provision of the Trading With the Enemy Act is punishable
by up to a $50,000 fine, up to ten years of imprisonment, or both. 50 U.S.C. app. § 16
(1982).
76. 22 U.S.C. §§ 611-618 (1982).
77. Pub. L. 75-583, 52 Stat. 631 (1938); see S. Rep. No. 1783, 75th Cong., 2d Sess. (1938).
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nizations to whom the material was disseminated. 8
From 1938 to 1945, nineteen criminal prosecutions were brought
for failure to comply with the dissemination controls imposed by
FARA.7' For example, an American employee of the Spanish Li-
brary of Information, a Spanish government-controlled organiza-
tion, was convicted of writing articles on behalf of the Spanish gov-
ernment without filing them with the Department of Justice,
labeling them as foreign political propaganda, and keeping records
of persons to whom the articles were disseminated. 0 Similarly,
nine Americans were convicted for disseminating political material
on behalf of the German-American Vocational League, an alleged
Nazi propaganda agency, without registering as foreign agents.81
The Postmaster General secured a ruling from the Attorney Gen-
eral in 1940 permitting him to exclude from the mails material en-
tering the United States from Germany which appeared designed
to influence Americans on behalf of Germany unless the material
was labeled and monitored in accordance with FARA.s2
The most publicized recent invocation of FARA took place in
1982, when the Internal Security Division of the Department of
Justice singled out three films produced under the auspices of the
National Film Board of Canada, ordered that they be labeled as
foreign political propaganda, and requested that records of thea-
ters and organizations showing the films be turned over to the Jus-
tice Department. 3 The three documentaries targeted by the Jus-
78. 22 U.S.C. §§ 612(a) (1982) (registration statement); id. 614(a) (dissemination report);
id. § 614(b) (labeling requirement). The text of FARA does not require disclosure of the
identities of persons to whom dissemination is made. However, 28 C.F.R. § 5.401 (1985)
requires that dissemination reports be filed on form OBD 69, requiring disclosure of any
organization or theater exhibiting a film and any person to whom 100 copies of any book or
pamphlet were disseminated. The disclosure forms are available for public inspection. 22
U.S.C. § 616 (1982). Failure to file the necessary forms is a criminal offense. 22 U.S.C. § 618
(1982).
79. For an excellent practical analysis of problems raised by FARA, see THE REGISTRA-
TION OF FOREIGN AGENTS IN THE UNITED STATES: A PRACTIcAL AND LEGAL GUIDE (D.C. Bar
Ass'n. 1981).
80. United States v. Kelly, 51 F. Supp. 362 (D.D.C. 1943).
81. United States v. German-American Vocational League, 153 F.2d 860 (3rd Cir.), cert.
denied, 328 U.S. 833, app. dism., 156 F.2d 235 (3rd Cir.), cert. denied, 329 U.S. 760 (1946).
82. 39 Op. Att'y Gen. 535 (1940).
83. The government made this determination without a hearing or notice to interested
parties. The incident is discussed in Canadian Films and Foreign Agents Registration Act:
Oversight Hearings Before the Subcom. on Civil and Constitutional Rights of the House
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tice Department dealt with acid rain and the threat of nuclear
war.
84
After the films' American distributors initiated legal action, a
stipulation was entered releasing the American distributors from
any duty to register as foreign agents or to label the films.8" The
Justice Department declined, however, to remove the films from
the coverage of FARA, leaving the New York office of the Cana-
dian Film Board with the apparent obligation to report their dis-
semination to the Justice Department."' Not surprisingly, once the
government labeled the films as foreign political propaganda, the
decision whether to exhibit them became politicized, often turning
less on the merits of the films than on the propriety of exhibiting
foreign political propaganda.87
Under the government's current reading of FARA, virtually any
book published abroad is a potential candidate for dissemination
control, so long as it has the capacity to rouse its American audi-
ence to "political" action.88 If, for example, Orwell's 1984 were
Comm. on the Judiciary, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983).
A challenge to the use of FARA against the Canadian films is pending currently. Block v.
Smith, appeal docketed, No. 84-5318 (D.C. Cir. April 2, 1984).
84. Id.
85. Declaration of Joseph E. Clarkson in Block v. Smith, appeal docketed, No. 84-8318
(D.C. Cir. April 2, 1984); see also Stipulation dated June 13, 1983 between plaintiffs and
defendants in Block v. Smith, appeal docketed, No. 84-5318 (D.C. Cir. April 2, 1984) (on file
in ACLU office).
86. Since 1947, the New York City Office of the National Film Board of Canada has vol-
untarily registered as an agent of a foreign principal and has submitted to the Justice De-
partment annual lists of Canadian films distributed in the United States. See Declarations
of William Litwack and Joseph E. Clarkson, submitted in Block v. Smith, appeal docketed,
No. 84-5318 (D.C. Cir. April 2, 1984). Once before, in 1962, a question arose concerning the
applicability of FARA dissemination controls to a Canadian Film Board production, but the
issue quickly was mooted by the withdrawal of the film from the American market. See
Memorandum of Law submitted on behalf of plaintiffs in Block v. Smith, appeal docketed,
No. 84-5318 (D.C. Cir. April 2, 1984).
87. See, e.g., Declarations of Christian Ballantyne and Donna Barkman, submitted in
Block v. Smith, appeal docketed, No. 84-5318 (D.C. Cir. April 2, 1984).
88. The definition of political propaganda subject to FARA dissemination controls is set
forth at 22 U.S.C. 611(0) (1982), which provides:
The term 'political progaganda' includes any oral, visual, graphic, written, pic-
torial, or other communication or expression by any person (1) which is reason-
ably adopted to, or which the person disseminating the same believes will, or
which he intends to, prevail upon, indoctrinate, convert, induce, or in any
other way influence a recipient or any section of the public within the United
States with reference to the political or public interests, policies, or relations of
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published by a British publishing house and distributed in the
United States, its dissemination in the United States by agents of
the foreign publishing company might well be subject to labeling
and monitoring under FARA.s9
Each of the four sets of controls discussed above involves at-
tempts to limit the flow of information from abroad across our na-
tional border. Censorship at the national border, however, blocks a
two way street. Each of the controls discussed below uses our bor-
der to keep information within the United States.
E. Controlling the Flow of Information Out of the United States
by Denying Passports
For over a century, the executive branch has used its power to
grant or deny passports to prevent certain Americans from travel-
ling abroad to speak or engage in political associations when such
speech or association was deemed detrimental by the Executive to
the nation's foreign policy interests or to its national security 0
a government of a foreign country or a foreign political party or with reference
to the foreign policies of the United States or to promote in the United States
racial, religious, or social dissensions, or (2) which advocates, advises, insti-
gates, or promotes any racial, social, political, or religious disorder, civil riot, or
other conflict involving the use of force or violence. As used in this subsection
the term 'disseminating' includes transmitting or causing to be transmitted in
the United States malls or by any means or instrumentality of interstate or
foreign commerce or offering or causing to be offered in the United States
mails.
89. It is possible to secure an exemption from FARA for "bona fide religious, scholastic,
academic or scientific pursuits or of the fine arts." 22 U.S.C. § 613(e) (1982). Whether 1984
would qualify for a "fine arts" exemption is speculative. Exemptions from FARA are also
available for persons engaged in private and nonpolitical activities in furtherance of bona
fide trade and commerce of a foreign principal. 22 U.S.C. § 613(d) (1982). Dissemination of
material falling under § 611(j) would, however, appear to block a § 613(d) exemption.
90. J. MOORE, A DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 920 (1906); U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, THE
AMERICAN PASSPORT 49-54 (1898); see also 13 Op. Att'y Gen. 89, 92; 23 Op. Att'y Gen. 509,
511; Exec. Order No. 654 (1907); Exec. Order No. 2119-A (1915); Exec. Order No. 2362-A
(1916); Exec. Order No. 2519-A (1917); 3 G. HACKWORTH, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
§ 268, at 498-99 (1942); 2 PAPERS RELATING TO FOREIGN RELATIONS OF UNITED STATES 1802
(1907).
This effort began with passage of the Passport Act of 1856, 11 Stat. 60 (1856) and then
continued under the Passport Act of 1926, 22 U.S.C. § 2121a (1926), as modified by Con-
gress in 1976 and 1978. See 1978 Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Pub. L. No. 95-426,
§ 124 (1978).
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Perhaps the most notorious attempt to prevent Americans from
going abroad to engage in speech was the denial, during the Mc-
Carthy era, of passports to American communists because of what
they might say or do while abroad.91 The Secretary of State even
denied a passport in 1948 to Leo Isaacson, a member of Congress
who wished to travel to Greece to speak in favor of the attempt to
establish a leftist regime.92 Other prominent Americans denied
passports in order to block speech abroad have included Arthur
Miller, Paul Robeson, and Linus Pauling.95
When, in 1978, Congress formally removed the Secretary's
peacetime power to impose geographical area restrictions on Amer-
ican passports, the use of passport restrictions as travel constraints
on American citizens seemingly had ended. In fact, area restric-
tions were quickly replaced by an even more effective travel deter-
rent-a prohibition on the spending of money for food or lodging
in proscribed countries.9 4 Moreover, in December 1979, the Secre-
tary of State asserted the power to revoke or deny an American's
passport for speech abroad "likely" to cause "serious damage" to
the nation's foreign policy or to its national security.95 The target
of the Secretary's wrath was Phillip Agee, a former official of the
CIA, who travelled abroad widely, exposing the activities of the
CIA in various countries and publicizing the identity of covert CIA
agents.9 6
While Agee's speech may arguably have fallen beyond the scope
of the first amendment, 97 the power asserted by the Secretary ex-
tends to any speech "likely" to do "serious damage" to the nation's
foreign policy. Presumably, therefore, Americans who travel
abroad to oppose the nation's foreign policy by engaging in speech
or association now risk revocation of their passports at the discre-
91. See Kent v. Dules, 357 U.S. 116 (1958); Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500
(1964); see Note, Passport Refusals for Political Reasons, 61 YAIM L. J. 171 (1952).
92. N.Y. Times, April 11, 1948, at E9.
93. See Note, supra note 91, at 176.
94. See supra notes 69-75 and accompanying text.
95. See 22 C.F.R. §§ 51.70(b)(4), 51.71(a) (1984). The regulations were issued in 1966.
96. The facts surrounding the revocation of Agee's passport are taken from the Supreme
Court's opinion in Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280 (1981). See infra notes 215-23 and accompany-
ing text.
97. Congress has since enacted a statute making it a crime to reveal the identity of a
covert CIA agent. See Intelligence Identities Protection Act of 1982, 50 U.S.C. § 421 (1982).
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tion of government officials whose policies they criticize."8
F. Restricting the Flow of Information Out of the United States
by Export Control Restrictions
In an effort to prevent the export of American technology to un-
friendly foreign nations, Congress has restricted trade in certain
items without regard to whether the items involve classified infor-
mation. Pursuant to the Export Administration Act of 1979, ee the
Arms Export Control Act of 1976100 and the regulations promul-
gated under both statutes,101 the Department of Commerce main-
talns a "Commodity Control Unit" and the Departments of State
and Defense maintain a "Munitions List." These mechanisms form
the basis of an export licensing system governing the export of cer-
tain unclassified "technical data." The definition of "technical
data" in the regulations is virtually unlimited, covering
information of any kind that can be used or adapted for use, in
the design, production, manufacture, utilization or reconstruc-
tion of articles or materials.10
Concerned over the alleged "hemorrhaging" of American techni-
cal know-how to foreign countries, the Reagan Administration has
98. The scope of the power asserted is demonstrated by an excerpt from the Solicitor
General's argument in Haig v. Agee.
Question: [Solicitor] General McCree, supposing a person right now were to
apply for a passport to go to Salvador, and when asked the purpose of his
journey, to say, to denounce the United States policy in Salvador in supporting
the junta. And the Secretary of State says, I just will not issue a passport for
that purpose. Do you think that he can consistently do that in the light of our
previous cases?
Mr. McCree: I would say, yes, he can. Because . .. [t]he President of the
United States and the Secretary of State working under him are charged with
conducting the foreign policy of the Nation, and the freedom of speech that we
enjoy domestically may be different from that we can exercise in this context.
Tr. of Oral Argument, Haig v. Agee, at 20.
99. 50 U.S.C. app. § 2401 (1982).
100. 22 U.S.C. § 2751 (1982). Although the Export Control Act formally expired on
March 30, 1984, the President has used emergency powers under IEEPA to continue its
restrictions in effect pending congressional enactment of renewal legislation. Exec. Order
No. 12,740, 49 Fed. Reg. 13,099 (1984).
101. 15 C.F.R. §8 368.1-399.2 (1985); 22 C.F.R. §§ 121.01-130.33 (1985).
102. 15 C.F.R. § 379.1(a) (1985); 22 C.F.R. § 125.01 (1985); see also 15 C.F.R. § 379.1(b)
(1985) (covering oral exchanges of information in the United States).
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used the export control machinery to restrict the flow of informa-
tion out of the United States by treating the delivery of a scientific
paper to an audience including foreigners as an "export" of techni-
cal data requiring an export license. For example, in 1982 the gov-
ernment forced the cancellation of at least 100 of the 700 papers
scheduled for presentation at an international symposium of
photo-optical engineers, 103 and forced the American Vacuum Soci-
ety to rescind invitations to scientists from Poland, Hungary, and
the Soviet Union.0
Having defined the delivery of a scientific paper before an inter-
national audience as a forbidden export of technical data,105 the
administration turned to academe. In 1981, the government de-
fined the teaching of certain practical, though unclassified, infor-
mation to students from China and Eastern Europe as an export of
technical data requiring an export license. Letters were sent to uni-
versity professors throughout the United States warning them to
use caution in teaching foreign students about, among other things,
advanced computer design or microelectronics because such teach-
ing might require an export license. 06 Although many educational
officials vigorously repudiated the government's attempt to block
the teaching of unclassified data to lawfully admitted foreign stu-
dents,107 the impact of the government's threats on individual
professors cannot be measured. The appearance of a course open
103. SCIENCE, September 24, 1982, at 1233.
104. See Holden, Feds Defend Bubble Meddle, SCIENCE, May 9, 1980, at 577. In April
1985, the government again forced cancellation of about a dozen unclassified papers sched-
uled for presentation at a conference sponsored by the Society of Photo-Optical Instrumen-
tation Engineers. N.Y. Times, April 8, 1985 at A15. Conferees attending the presentation of
certain other papers were required to certify that they would not export the information
presented. N.Y. Times, April 9, 1985, at A21.
105. 15 C.F.R. § 379.1(b) (1985).
106. See NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES: SCIENTIFIC COMMUNICATION AND NATIONAL SE-
CURITY (1982) (popularly known as the CORSON REPORT after Dale Corson, former President
of Cornell University); see also M. WALLERSTEIN & L. MCCRAY, UPDATE OF THE CORSON RE-
PORT, Jan. 26, 1984, at 12, cited in Shattuck, Federal Restrictions on the Free Flow of Aca-
demic Information and Ideas, Harvard University, Office of Vice President for Government,
Community and Public Affairs, January 1985; SCIENTIFIC AMERICAN, April 1982, at 70.
107. For a particularly eloquent and courageous response, see CORSON REPORT, supra note
106, at 172-81 (response of the University of Minnesota). Harvard and Stanford also took
firm positions rejecting the initiative. See HARvARD CIMsoN, Dec. 2, 1981; CORSON REPORT,
supra note 106, at 180-81. Several incidents are briefly described in Shattuck, supra note
106, at 20-23.
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only to American citizens at a school like UCLA is hardly an en-
couraging sign. 08
G. Inhibitions on the Export of American Films and Audio- Visual
Materials
In 1948, the United States formulated the so-called "Beirut
Agreement."' 10 9 The purpose of the Agreement is to facilitate the
international circulation of films and audio-visual materials. To
promote that goal, signatories agree to waive import duties, fees
and taxes on any item certified as educational, scientific, or cul-
tural by the exporting country. 10 The United States is a signatory
to the Beirut Agreement and our obligations under the Agreement
are carried out by the United States Information Agency
(USIA).""' The USIA, however, has refused to certify for duty-free
treatment any American film that "attempts to influence opinion,
conviction or policy . . . [or] to espouse a cause.""' 2
Thirty American films were denied certification in 1979, 27 in
1980, 34 in 1981, and 31 in 1982 and the first three months of
1983.11s Among the well-known films denied certification were The
Killing Ground, an ABC documentary on toxic waste disposal that
won two Emmys and First Prize at the Monte Carlo Film Festival;
Soldier Girls, a documentary about a platoon of female army re-
cruits undergoing basic training that won the Prix Italia and a
British Academy Award; and Joseph Strick's Academy Award-win-
108. The course at UCLA open only to American citizens involves Metal Matrix Com-
posites, which, although unclassified, deals with technical data deemed by the government
to be subject to export control. See M. WALLERSTEIN & L. McCRAY, supra note 106, at 9.
109. Agreement for Facilitating the International Circulation of Visual and Auditory
Materials of an Educational, Scientific and Cultural Character, opened for signature, July
15, 1949, 17 U.S.T. 1578, T.I.A.S. No. 6116, 197 U.N.T.S.3 (1949). Entered into force with
respect to the United States on January 12, 1967. See S. Rep. No. 626, 89th Cong. Ad.
News, 3143. Pub. L. No. 89-634, 80 Stat. 879 (1967) (formal ratification).
110. Id.
111. 22 C.F.R. §§ 502.1-.8 (1985).
112. 22 C.F.R. § 502.6(b)(3) (1985). USIA regulations require a film to be "educational,"
which is defined as material that "instruct[s], or inform[s] . . . maintain[s], increase[s] or
diffuse[s] knowledge... augment[s] international understanding and good will... [and is]
representative, authentic, and accurate." 22 C.F.R. § 502.6(a)(3) (1985).
113. Robinson, Silenced Screens. The Role of the United States Information Agency in
Denying Export Certificates to American Films, 17 N.Y.U. J. OF INT'L L. AND POL.
(1985) (forthcoming).
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ning Interviews with My Lai Veterans.114 Because denial of certifi-
cation subjects an American film to payment of foreign import du-
ties of up to $50,000,115 the failure to certify often renders
exportation economically impossible, thus blocking the exportation
of scores of controversial films critical of the United States.
When Americans cannot buy books and magazines from coun-
tries on a Presidential enemies list; cannot import "subversive"
books; cannot hear foreign speakers with suspect political back-
grounds; cannot travel to foreign countries where the President
does not wish them to go; cannot disseminate, read, or view many
foreign books or films on political issues without being reported to
the Internal Security Division of the Department of Justice; cannot
vigorously denounce American policies abroad without risking
passport revocation; cannot deliver scientific papers to interna-
tional audiences or teach university courses in advanced physics or
optics to foreign students without government permission; and
cannot export controversial films without USIA certification, we
have allowed our national border to take on the attributes of an
information barrier. While the barrier may not be "iron," it is a
barrier nevertheless. Even a nylon curtain is a serious threat to our
role as a symbol of intellectual openness in a world where censor-
ship and information control threaten to become the norm.
114. The reasons given for denial of certification convey the highly ideological nature of
the reviewing process. Among the films denied certification through 1984 were:
1. From the Ashes ... Nicaragua Today. Reason: Fails to mention Cuban and
Soviet influence on Nicaraguan Military Buildup; Presented United States as
aggressor in the U.S.-Nicaragua relationship.
2. Whatever Happened to Childhood? Reason: Although material is represen-
tative, authentic and accurate, it distorts the real picture of ... youth in the
U.S. because only small percentage are troubled.
3. Resurgence: The Movement for Equality vs. the Klu Klux Klan. Reason:
Klan influence in U.S. overstated; film could too easily be construed as typical
of U.S. as a whole, suggests that U.S. government fosters Klan.
4. Soldier Girls. Reason: Sequences may lend themselves to being misunder-
stood and misinterpreted by foreign audiences.
5. The Killing Ground. Reason: Might mislead foreign audiences to believe
Americans need arousing to dangers of hazardous wastes, which is no longer
true.
6. Campaign '80. Reason: Could lead to misunderstanding of U.S. and political
institutions by foreign audiences.
115. Rosenberg, For Our Eyes Only, AMERICA FaiL, July-Aug. 1983, at 40-41. Robinson,
supra note 113, at 182-87.
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II. THE CURRENT STATE OF JUDICIAL PROTECTION OF THE FLOW OF
IDEAS ACROSS OUR NATIONAL BORDER
Perhaps the most significant and least controversial role of judi-
cial review in a democratic system is the protection of the flow of
information and ideas necessary for functioning self-government." 6
Democratic principles are reinforced, not diminished, by judicial
review that prevents a transient majority from tampering with the
flow of information necessary to assure its continued political ac-
countability.11 Not surprisingly, therefore, we have grown accus-
tomed, especially during the past sixty-five years,1 ' to a vigorous,
dual judicial role in the preservation of free expression.
On one level, American judges have created procedural guide-
lines to minimize the potential for majoritarian overreaching.
Whether the procedural guidelines have been couched as prohibi-
tions on vague"19 or overbroad'2" statutes, bans on standardless
permit systems, 2' doctrines of clear statement, 2' or restrictions on
116. See generally J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DIsmuci. A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEw
(1980); see also United States v. Carolene Prod. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938) (Stone,
C.J.).
117. The role of the judiciary in protecting speech necessary for democratic decisionmak-
ing is often associated with the writings of Alexander Meiklejohn. See A. MEIKLEJOHN, FREE
SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT (1948); A. MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM
(1960).
118. Modem conceptions of the role of the judiciary in enforcing the first amendment
date from classic Holmes-Brandeis opinions in Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375
(1927) (Brandeis, J., joined by Holmes, J., concurring); Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652,
673 (1925) (Holmes, J., dissenting); Pierce v. United States, 252 U.S. 239 (1920) (Brandeis,
J., joined by Holmes, J., dissenting); Schaeffer v. United States, 251 U.S. 466 (1920) (Bran-
deis, J., joined by Holmes, J., dissenting); Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919)
(Holmes, J., joined by Brandeis, J., dissenting); Debs v. United States, 249 U.S. 211 (1919);
Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 204 (1919); see also Masses Publishing Co. v. Patten, 244
Fed. 535 (S.D.N.Y. 1917) (L. Hand, J.), rev'd 246 F.24 (2d Cir. 1917). The first modern case
to overturn a conviction on what would today be considered first amendment grounds was
Fiske v. Kansas, 274 U.S. 380 (1927). Gitlow was repudiated in Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395
U.S. 444 (1969) (per curiam). See generally Strong, Fifty Years of Clear and Present Dan-
ger: From Schenck to Brandenburg-And Beyond, 1969 Sup. CT. REV. 41.
119. E.g., Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 573 (1974); Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408
U.S. 104, 109 n.5 (1972); Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360, 372 (1964); Hemdon v. Lowry, 301
U.S. 242, 261 (1937); see also Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 369 (1931).
120. E.g., Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611 (1971); Thornhill v. Alabama, 310
U.S. 88 (1940); cf. Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601 (1973).
121. E.g., Haynes v. Oradel, 425 U.S. 610 (1976); Shuttelsworth v. Birmingham, 394 U.S.
147 (1969); Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147 (1939); Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444
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delegation, 123 the common theme has been an insistence upon rig-
orous adherence to prophylactic procedural norms, often rooted in
respect for separation of powers, designed to insulate free expres-
sion from majoritarian erosion.
On a substantive level, American judges, confronted with a chal-
lenge to a restriction on free expression, have asked two questions:
one, does the restriction suppress a particular point of view;124 and,
two, even if no selective suppression is involved, is the restriction
genuinely necessary to achieve an important social goal? 125
Federal courts on occasion, have been protective of first amend-
ment values in cases affecting the free flow of information across
our national border.126 More typically, however, national border
cases have been regarded as sui generis by the federal courts and,
consequently, the doctrinal protections of the first amendment
(1938); see also Staub v. City of Baxley, 355 U.S. 313 (1958); Kunz v. New York, 340 U.S.
290 (1951); Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 268 (1951); Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516
(1945); Largent v. Texas, 318 U.S. 418 (1943); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
122. E.g., Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474, 507 (1959); Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116
(1958); see also Schneider v. Smith, 390 U.S. 17, 25 (1968); United States v. Laub, 385 U.S.
475 (1967); Viereck v. United States, 318 U.S. 236 (1943).
123. Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88, 116-17 (1976); see also A.L.A. Schechter
Poultry Co. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935); Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S.
388 (1935).
124. E.g., Police Dep't of Chicago v. City of Mosley, 408 U.S. 92 (1972); Murdock v. Penn-
sylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943); Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233 (1936).
125. E.g., Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971); Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444
(1969) (per curiam); New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964); West Virginia State
Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943); Hague v. C.I.O., 307 U.S. 496 (1939).
126. Procedural guidelines were enforced in Viereck v. United States, 318 U.S. 236 (1943)
when the Supreme Court applied the doctrine of clear statement in narrowly construing the
Foreign Agents Registration Act to exclude publications disseminated by a foreign agent on
his own behalf. Similarly, in Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116 (1958), the Court explicitly in-
voked the doctrine of clear statement and the delegation doctrine to strike down regulations
denying passports to American communists. Finally, in United States v. Laub, 385 U.S. 475
(1967), the Court, once again, used the clear statement rule to block criminal prosecution of
Americans for travelling to Cuba in violation of geographical area bans inserted into their
passports.
Classic substantive first amendment doctrine was applied in Aptheker v. Secretary of
State, 378 U.S. 500 (1964), when the Supreme Court struck down a statutory prohibition on
granting passports to American communists and in Lamont v. Postmaster Gen., 381 U.S.
301 (1965), when the Court invalidated postal regulations requiring addresses of "commu-
nist political propaganda" to specifically request its delivery. See also Zemel v. Rusk, 381
U.S. 1 (1965) (upholding a travel ban to a Cuban at the height of the Cuban missile crisis
based on classic first amendment standards).
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have not been applied.12" The net result of the Court's ambivalence
about classic first amendment review in national border cases has
been the gradual emergence of a degree of censorship at the border
that would not be tolerated in any other sphere of our national life.
The Court's ambivalence about exercising classic first amend-
ment review in national border settings appears to rest on the con-
fluence of three factors. First, many, if not all, of the procedural
techniques used to insulate the first amendment from majoritarian
erosion are drawn from classic separation of powers theory.128 The
void for vagueness doctrine, the doctrine of clear statement, the
ban on standardless permits, and the general restriction on legisla-
tive delegation all seek to enforce the proper allocation of author-
ity between the legislative and executive branches. When a case
arises in the context of the national border, however, it often in-
volves areas, such as foreign policy or military deployment, where
classic separation of powers theory is at least arguably inapplica-
ble. Unlike most lawmaking settings, where the legislature's pri-
macy is conceded and the Executive's role is perceived generally as
derivative, 29 national border cases often involve areas where the
Executive plausibly asserts power to act as the primary enunciator
of policy, or, at the very least, as an equal partner with the
Congress. 30
127. For example, in Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280 (1981), the Court refused to apply vague-
ness, overbreadth, delegation or clear statement rules in upholding regulations granting
power to the Secretary of State to revoke a passport because of speech likely to do serious
damage to American foreign policy. In Regan v. Wald, 104 S. Ct. 3026 (1984), the Court
refused to apply well established canons of statutory construction in upholding the power of
the Secretary of the Treasury to ban personal expenditures for food or lodging while travel-
ling in Cuba. In Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753 (1972), the Court brushed aside sub-
stantive first amendment challenges to the refusal to permit a Marxist economist to enter
the country to make a speech.
128. For a general discussion of separation of powers theory, see W. GwYNN, THE MEAN-
ING OF THE SEPARATION OF POWERS (1965); M. VILE, CONSTITUTIONALISM AND THE SEPARATION
OF POWERS (1967). See generally Quint, The Separation of Powers Under Nixon: Reflec-
tions on Constitutional Liberties and the Law, 1981 DUKE L. J. 1; Quint, The Separation of
Powers Under Carter, 62 Tax. L. J. 785 (1984); Sharp, The Classical American Doctrine of
Separation of Powers, 2 U. CHL L. REv. 385 (1934-1935).
129. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
130. See, e.g., Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654 (1981); C & S Airlines v. Waterman
S.S. Co., 333 U.S. 103 (1948); United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203 (1942); United States v.
Curtiss-Wright Export Co., 229 U.S. 304 (1936); Charlton v. Kelly, 229 U.S. 447 (1913);
Holtzman v. Schlesinger, 484 F.2d 1307, 1308-12 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 936
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Because the precise allocation of power between the legislative
branch and the executive branch is uncharted in many national
border cases, courts understandably are reluctant to enforce proce-
dural norms designed to assure the strict functional separation of
legislative and executive power. This Article argues, however, that
while reluctance to enforce strict separation of powers norms may
make good sense in national border cases not implicating substan-
tive constitutional values, when substantial first amendment con-
cerns are added to the equation, the balance tips decidedly toward
judicial enforcement of separation of power norms, to prevent the
concentration of censorial power in the hands of a single branch.13 1
Second, traditional substantive first amendment review often re-
quires a court to measure the gravity of the asserted governmental
interest in suppressing the speech in question."32 In national bor-
der cases, however, the nature of the asserted governmental inter-
est often involves assessments of fact and policy beyond the insti-
tutional competence of the judiciary, making judges extremely
wary of estimating the importance of an asserted government justi-
fication. For example, in upholding regulations that prevent Amer-
icans from travelling to Cuba,133 or from listening to foreign speak-
ers, T13 the Supreme Court refused to measure the gravity of the
asserted governmental justifications and, thus, felt bound to defer
to any justification that was not facially invalid. This Article ar-
gues that such a reluctance, while understandable, should not pre-
clude review of censorship programs that are obviously not con-
(1974); Goldwater v. Carter, 481 F. Supp. 949 (D.D.C.), rev'd, 617 F.2d 697 (D.C. Cir.), va-
cated, 444 U.S. 996 (1979).
131. See infra notes 245-64 and accompanying text. The dual role of separation of powers
as a functional device for allocating power to the appropriate branch and as a prophylactic
device designed to prevent undue concentrations of power in a single branch is discussed in
Neuborne, Judicial Review and Separation of Powers in France and the United States, 57
N.Y.U. L. REv. 363 (1982). See generally M. VILE, supra note 128, at 1-118 (prophylactic
role); W. GWYNN, supra note 128, at 31-35, 119-24; A. VILE, supra note 128, at 53-75 (func-
tional role). Using the shorthand labels, functional separation of powers is not present in
many national border cases; but when national border cases implicate substantive constitu-
tional values like free speech, a degree of prophylactic separation of powers is particularly
important.
132. In Lamont v. Postmaster Gen., 381 U.S. 301 (1965), for example, the Court ridiculed
the asserted governmental interest.
133. Regan v. Wald, 104 S. Ct. 3026 (1984).
134. Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753 (1972).
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tent-neutral, and should not preclude review of purported
justifications that verge on the pretextual. 135
Finally, traditional first amendment review often requires a
court to balance the risks of censorship against the risk of free flow
of the information.136 The articulation of the clear and present
danger test is simply one example of judicial reluctance to specu-
late about the effects of speech that form the basis for government
censorship. In many national border contexts, however, the as-
serted justifications for censorship involve damage to foreign policy
and national security interests. Confronted with such grave poten-
tial consequences, courts have been reluctant to require proof of a
close nexus between the speech and the asserted evil. Instead,
courts have permitted censorship so long as the evil might flow
from the speech.113 Given the danger to a free society created by
widespread censorship at the national border, reviewing courts
should insist upon proof, not merely that speech might damage our
foreign policy or even our national security, but that it is reasona-
bly likely to do so. Moreover, at a minimum, the gravity of the evil
that can justify national border censorship must be greater than
mere damage to an administration's amorphous "foreign policy"
interests; rather, a genuine threat to national security must arise
before the national border can be used to impede the free flow of
ideas.138
135. See infra text accompanying notes 231-44.
136. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (per curiam). In Aptheker v. Secretary of
State, 378 U.S. 500 (1964), for example, the Court insisted upon making an independent
determination of the danger created by providing passports of American communists.
137. See supra note 133 and accompanying text. In Regan v. Wald, the Court did not
require any substantiation for the government's assertion that American travel dollars (at
most, 8 million dollars per year) would materially aid the Cuban economy, despite the fact
that the government permitted American corporations to engage in hundreds of millions of
dollars in annual trade with Cuba through wholly owned foreign subsidiaries.
The United States lifted its embargo on trade with Cuban by foreign subsidiaries of
United States corporations in 1975 and approved the end of the embargo imposed by the
Organization of American States as well. CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY, INC., 1502 (May 31,
1980); see RESOLUTION I OF THE SIXTEENTH MEETING OF CONSULTATION OF MINISTERS OF FOR-
EIGN AFFAIRS (July 29, 1975); DEPARTMENT OF STATE, 1975 DIGEST OF UNITED STATES PRAC-
TICE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 20, 25, 601 (1976).
138. The distinction between "foreign policy" and "national security" is at the heart of
the McGovern Amendment, which seeks to prevent the use of section (a)(28) to exclude
speakers for "foreign policy" reasons, but recognizes "national security" as a permissible
basis for exclusion. 22 U.S.C. § 2691 (1982).
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Before elaborating what we believe to be the appropriate judicial
role in national border-censorship cases, we review the current le-
gal status of the various programs discussed in Part I.
A. Denying Visas to Foreign Speakers
Judicial review of ideological exclusion of foreign speakers is
complicated by occasional confusion over whose rights are at stake.
An alien outside the United States has no constitutional right to
enter the country, even for the purpose of delivering a speech, but
an American listener inside the country stands on an entirely dif-
ferent constitutional footing. The Supreme Court has explicitly
recognized that the first amendment includes the right to receive,
as well as the right to disseminate, information.139 Since the exclu-
sion of foreign speakers sharply affects the rights of American
audiences to receive information from abroad, Americans wishing
to invite a foreign speaker have both standing and a cognizable
cause of action under current law to challenge a refusal by the gov-
ernment to permit the speaker to enter the United States. 40
Unfortunately, while the procedural questions have been re-
solved in favor of judicial review, the substantive standard applied
by the courts has been virtually useless. Focusing more on the
rhetoric than the actual holding in Kleindienst v. Mandel, lower
federal courts have refused to distinguish between visa denials that
are ideologically based and those that are not.'4 ' Even in the for-
mer instance, most courts, with one recent and notable example,
have deferred to the government's proffered explanation for ex-
cluding a foreign speaker. The government has not been asked to
defend the substantiality of its interests, show the likelihood of
damage if the speech is allowed, or show the gravity of the antici-
pated harm. Fairly read, Kleindienst does not compel such a de-
139. The first amendment right to receive information was explicitly recognized in First
Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978); Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396
(1974); Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753 (1972); Lamont v. Postmaster Gen., 381 U.S.
301 (1965). The right to receive information is at the heart of the recognition of the pro-
tected nature of commercial speech. See Neuborne, A Rationale for Protecting and Regu-
lating Commercial Speech, 46 BROOKLYN L. REv. 437 (1980).
140. See Kleindienst, 408 U.S. at 753 (1972); see also Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787 (1977).
141. See, e.g., Abourezk v. Reagan, 592 F. Supp. 880 (D.D.C. 1984), appeal docketed, No.
84-5673 (D.C. Cir. Oct. 16, 1984).
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gree of judicial restraint when a viable first amendment claim is
presented. 142
In Kleindienst, the issue was whether Ernst Mandel should have
been granted an entry visa to permit him to deliver a series of lec-
tures at American universities. 143 Noting Mandel's international
reputation as a Marxist theoretician, the government declared him
excludable under section (a)(28). 1 Six American professors who
had either invited Mandel to the United States or who hoped to
engage in colloquia with him challenged the Attorney General's re-
fusal to grant him a waiver as an exercise of content-based censor-
ship.'4 5 The district court directed the Attorney General to grant
the waiver unless the denial could be justified as necessary to pro-
tect a weighty government interest.' 46 The decision was overturned
by the Supreme Court, which accepted the government's argument
that the refusal to grant a waiver was not based on Mandel's views
or the content of his proposed speeches, but solely because he had
violated conditions attached to an earlier waiver by engaging in
impermissible fund-raising activity.' 47 Confronted with such a
"facially-neutral and bona fide reason" for denying the waiver, the
Court refused to weigh the government's interest against the first
amendment rights of Mandel's American audience. 148
Kleindienst did not decide the facial constitutionality of section
(a)(28), or the proper judicial response to visa denials that cannot
be justified in content-neutral terms.'49 Nonetheless, the Klein-
dienst decision has been given the broadest possible reading by
most lower courts. For example, in NGO Committee on Disarma-
ment v. Haig"5" and McDonald v. Kleindienst,'5' visa denials to
foreign speakers were upheld despite the apparent relationship be-
tween the speaker's politics and the visa denial, and despite the
142. Kleindienst, 408 U.S. at 757.
143. Id. at 762.
144. Id. at 759.
145. Id. at 762.
146. Mandel v. Mitchell, 325 F. Supp. 620 (E.D.N.Y. 1971), rev'd, Kleindienst v. Mandel,
408 U.S. 753 (1972).
147. 403 U.S. at 769.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 770.
150. No. 82 Civ. 3636 (S.D.N.Y. 1982), aff'd, 697 F.2d 294 (2d Cir. 1982).
151. No. 72 Civ. 1228 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
[Vol. 26:719
THE NYLON CURTAIN
government's failure to articulate any substantial justification.152
Passage of the McGovern Amendment reduces the likelihood
that section (a)(28) cases like Kleindienst will recur. It is ex-
tremely improbable, for example, that the State Department could
have or would have certified to Congress that Mandel's admission
to the United States to deliver a series of speeches threatened na-
tional security. Had the McGovern Amendment been in effect at
the time, Mandel probably would have received a visa. Nothing on
the face of the McGovern Amendment compels the Attorney Gen-
eral, who actually issues the waiver of ineligibility under section
(a)(28), to accept the recommendation of the Secretary of State.
The desire to preserve political harmony between the State and
Justice Departments, however, is a potent political consideration
reinforcing the spirit of the McGovern Amendment.
Perhaps for that reason, reliance on section (a)(28) has notice-
ably decreased in controversial cases. Instead, section (a)(27), not
subject to the McGovern Amendment, has emerged as the princi-
pal impediment to foreign speakers seeking admission to the
United States.153 The extent to which section (a)(27) will continue
to serve as a censorial substitute for section (a)(28) turns on the
outcome of two pending challenges to its use.
In both Allende v. Shultz5 4 and Abourezk v. Reagan,15 5 Ameri-
can citizens whose invitations to foreign speakers were frustrated
by denied entry visas challenged the use of section (a)(27) as a cen-
sorship device. 156 The complaints in each case assert similar claims:
152. Compare Lesbian/Gay Freedom Day Comm. v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv.,
541 F. Supp. 569 (N.D. Cal. 1982), aff'd, Hill v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 714
F.2d 1470 (9th Cir. 1983).
153. An exclusion under section (a)(27) is also not subject to a waiver by the Attorney
General. See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(3) (1982).
154. Allende v. Shultz, No. 83-3984-C (D. Mass.) (Mem Op. April 2, 1985) (speaking invi-
tations to Mrs. Hortensia Allende in San Francisco and Boston).
155. Abourezk v. Reagan, 592 F. Supp. 880 (D.D.C. 1984), appeal docketed, No. 84-5681
(D.C. Cir. Sept. 28, 1984). The Abourezk case, which challenges the government's refusal to
permit Thomas Borge, the Minister of Interior of Nicaragua, to fulfill speaking invitations
in the United States, is consolidated with The City of New York v. Shultz, appeal docketed,
No. 84-5681 (D.C. Cir. Oct. 16, 1984), challenging the government's refusal to permit two
Cuban invitees to testify before the New York City Commission on the Status of Women
and Cronin v. Shultz, No. 84-5708 (D.C. Cir. Oct. 16, 1984) challenging the government's
refusal to permit General Nino Pasti to accept speaking invitations in the United States.
156. See supra note 24-37 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Allende,
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first, that section (a)(27) was not intended to authorize visa details
based on lawful speech or association, but solely to authorize visa
denials based on improper "activities" within the United States;
and, second, that the visa denials violated the first amendment.
The district court in Abourezk rejected both theories in an opin-
ion that illustrates the reluctance of courts to apply traditional
first amendment analysis in national border-censorship cases.157
While conceding that the plaintiff's statutory argument was a pow-
erful one-indeed, that a literal reading of the statute would not
encompass the power to ban foreign speakers-the district court
declined to apply the classic maxim that doubts about the meaning
of a statute should be resolved in favor of free expression. 158 In-
stead, the court elected to extend the statute beyond its literal
terms to permit the exclusion of someone whose mere entry or
presence in the United States-as opposed to his improper activi-
ties once there-would be prejudicial to the public interest.159
Moreover, the district court explicitly refused to apply the doc-
trines of vagueness, delegation, or the ban on standardless permits
despite the assertion of wholly unbridled discretion in the Execu-
tive to ban foreign speakers. 60
The plaintiff's substantive first amendment challenge fared no
better. Citing Kleindienst, the district court required only that the
government articulate a facially neutral reason for denying the
visas, and did not inquire whether the reason was plausible, or
whether the facial justification was sufficiently compelling or immi-
nent to warrant the suppression of free expression. 16' Moreover,
the district court permitted the government to articulate its al-
leged facially neutral justification, not openly as in Kleindienst,
but through secret affidavits never revealed to plaintiffs' counsel. 6 2
The district court in Abourezk did hold that the government
could not constitutionally bar a foreign speaker from entering the
Abourezk, City of New York, and Cronin cases.
157. Abourezk, 592 F. Supp. at 886-88.
158. Id. at 884-85.
159. The District Court noted: "On a strictly textual basis, [plaintiffs'] contention is not
unpersuasive, for the statutory provision mentions only activities." Id. at 884.
160. Id. at 886 n.19.
161. Id. at 888.
162. Id. at 887-88.
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United States "solely on account of his proposed message." '163 The
potential significance of that ruling was largely undermined, how-
ever, by the court's final disposition of the case. In particular, the
court's apparent acceptance of an impermissible ideological motive
on the government's part is difficult to defend. The secrecy sur-
rounding the government's case renders any comment necessarily
speculative, but, based on the district court's own thumbnail
description of the in camera evidence,16 4 the visa denials in
Abourezk appear to have been based on the government's desire to
express its disapproval of the speakers' political views, in some in-
stances because such an expression of disapproval was desired by a
friendly government. Assuming that was the gist of the secret affi-
davits submitted in Abourezk, the content-based nature of the
government's censorship could not be more apparent. 65 Ironically,
the government's desire to use the visa denial process as a form of
symbolic disapproval of a foreign speaker's politics was allowed by
the district court to take precedence over the desires of American
citizens to hear the speakers in question.
The court in Allende16 6 reached a different result through a dif-
ferent procedure. Specifically, the district judge refused to grant
summary judgment based on secret affidavits.167 Confining himself
to the public record, he concluded that the government's assertion
that the admission of Ms. Allende "would [be] prejudicial to the
conduct of the foreign affairs of the United States" was too con-
clusory to overcome plaintiff's first amendment interest in hearing
Ms. Allende.6 8 In addition, the Allende decision points to the
adoption of the McGovern Amendment as a significant indicia of
congressional interest, and strongly suggests that section (a)(28)
rather than section (a)(27) is the appropriate statute for the gov-
163. Id. at 887.
164. Id. at 888.
165. The claim that the government's obligation of content-neutrality will be confused
with the government's endorsement of ideas it opposes has been rejected consistently in first
amendment cases. See Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981); Prune Yard Shopping
Center v. Robbins, 447 U.S. 74 (1980); Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169 (1972).
166. Allende v. Shultz, No. 83-3984-C (D. Mass. April 2, 1985).
167. Id. at 11-13.
168. Id. at 9-10. Plaintiff's appeal in Abourezk was argued before the Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia Circuit on September 23, 1985.
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ernment to use in ideological exclusion cases."'
Of course, settings do exist in which section (a)(27) may be ap-
plied properly to deny an entry visa. For example, in El-Werfali v.
Smith,17 0 a Libyan student was denied a visa under section (a)(27)
because his proposed activities in the United States included train-
ing in aircraft maintenance. A world of difference exists, however,
between denying a visa to a student from a potentially hostile na-
tion who wishes to acquire skills with obvious military relevance
and denying a visa to a person who has been invited by American
citizens to deliver a speech. Unless and until the courts can be per-
suaded of that difference, however, section (a)(27) will continue to
function as a virtually unreviewable grant of power to the Execu-
tive to censor foreign speakers on the basis of their politics.
B. Bans on the Importation of Foreign Books
Pursuant to the settlement in The Nation v. Haig,7 single cop-
ies of books and periodicals from countries designated by the Pres-
ident as enemy nations may now be brought into the United States
without an import license. Multiple copies of such material, and
films, continue to require an import license that will not be issued
unless the imported items are free.17 2 The existence of the 1982
truce on single copy imports alleviates, but does not solve, the con-
stitutional problem. Moreover, the fragility of the truce, as well as
the continuing ban on imports of more than a single copy, makes
additional litigation likely. Under current case law, the prospect
for such legal action is far from promising.
In Teague v. Regional Commissioner of Customs,'73 the United
States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit rejected a challenge
to the refusal to deliver English language newspapers produced in
North Vietnam and China to American addressees without an im-
port license. When the government represented to the court that
licenses for newspapers mailed free of charge would be granted
169. Id.
170. 547 F. Supp. 152 (S.D.N.Y. 1982).
171. See supra notes 52-57 and accompanying text.
172. See supra notes 45-48 and accompanying text.
173. 404 F.2d 441 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 394 U.S 977 (1968).
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within ten days of application, the court dismissed the case,1"4
without confronting the possible conflict between Lamont v. Post-
master General,7 5 which had invalidated a postal requirement
that an addressee of Communist political propaganda explicitly re-
quest its delivery, and Teague,'76 which required an addressee of
North Vietnamese or Chinese newspapers to request their delivery
and to swear that he was not paying for them. 7
Similarly, in Vietnam Veterans Against the War v. Regional
Commissioner of Customs (VVAW),'17 the United States Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit upheld the refusal to deliver newspa-
pers mailed free of charge from North Vietnam and China unless
the addressees applied for and received import licenses for each
item. In an opinion more sophisticated than Teague, the Third
Circuit recognized the tension between its holding and Lamont,
but expressed its hope that the license applications would be kept
confidential. 7 Unlike Lamont, where no plausible explanation was
ever offered for the disclosure requirement,1 0 the court held that
the act of obtaining a license was necessary to the functioning of
the trade embargo.
Neither Teague nor VVAW dealt with a ban on importation of
books. Each dealt solely with the constitutionality of procedures
for obtaining delivery of books concededly falling outside the
TWEA's ban. Thus, were the government to abrogate the 1982
truce and attempt to apply the TWEA to the purchase of single
copies of books and magazines, neither Teague nor VVAW would
provide a precedent. The Supreme Court's recent opinion in Regan
174. The Second Circuit concluded that any restrictions on free speech were merely inci-
dental to "the proper general purpose of the regulations: restricting the dollar flow to hostile
nations." Id. at 445.
175. 381 U.S. 301 (1965).
176. See supra note 173.
177. The certiorari petition in Teague was delayed in the mail several days by a snow-
storm which disrupted mail service in New York City and Washington, D.C., causing the
petition to arrive out of time under the then existing rules of the Supreme Court. Justices
Black and Douglas, dissenting from the denial of certiorari, stressed the possible conflict
between Lamont and Teague and suggested that the petition's late receipt was a factor in
the denial of certiorari. 394 U.S. at 977. Justice Harlan also dissented from the denial of
certiorari. 394 U.S. at 984.
178. 459 F.2d 676 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 933 (1972).
179. Id. at 682.
180. Id.
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v. Wald,'5 ' upholding the validity of the TWEA regulations forbid-
ding travelers to Cuba from buying food or lodging without a Trea-
sury Department license, does, however, offer some indication of
current judicial thinking on the subject. If a travel ban is valid, a
similar regulation forbidding the purchase of books and magazines
also might be valid, although the strength of the first amendment
right to receive books from abroad is apparently perceived by the
Court as stronger than the mere freedom to travel outside the
country. i 2 Nevertheless, the Court's decision in Regan hardly
bodes well for future TWEA cases.
The legal status of attempts by customs officials to search in-
coming baggage for subversive books in an alleged attempt to en-
force 19 U.S.C. section 1305 seems less problematic. 18 3 The Su-
preme Court repeatedly has held that careful procedures must
surround any attempt to seize material putatively within the pro-
tection of the first amendment.8 4 Whatever the power of customs
officials to conduct border searches generally, the absence of any
standards or mechanisms to control the unbridled discretion of of-
ficers searching for books, even at the border, renders the current
practice constitutionally suspect. Indeed, the government appears
to concede as much. When customs officials seized books and news-
papers from William Worthy upon his return from Iran, the gov-
ernment settled his claim for $16,000, returned all the seized mate-
rial, and destroyed all records of the incident.11 5 The government
has not, however, promulgated guidelines designed to prevent the
seizure of books at the border without prior judicial approval.8 6
C. Bans on Travel to Forbidden Countries
When President Carter ended restrictions on travel to Cuba in
181. 104 S. Ct. 3026 (1984).
182. The Regan Court demoted the capacity to engage in international travel from a
"right" to a "freedom." See infra note 195 and accompanying text.
183. See supra notes 58-62.
184. E.g., Roaden v. Kentucky, 413 U.S. 496 (1973); Heller v. New York, 413 U.S. 483
(1973); Lee Art Theater v. Virginia, 392 U.S. 636 (1968); A Quantity of Books v. Kansas, 378
U.S. 205 (1964); Marcus v. Search Warrant, 367 U.S. 717 (1961); see Monaghan, First
Amendment "Due Process", 83 HARv. L. REV. 518 (1970).
185. See supra note 59.
186. Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51 (1968).
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1977,18" and Congress outlawed the use of area restrictions in
American passports in 1978,188 Americans were free for the first
time in many years to travel anywhere without hindrance by their
government. Four years later, the era of free travel ended abruptly
with the reassertion of Treasury regulations under the TWEA for-
bidding expenditures for food or lodging while traveling in forbid-
den countries. 89
Food and lodging restrictions were upheld by the Supreme Court
in Regan v. Wald.190 The plaintiffs in Regan, American citizens
wishing to travel to Cuba, launched three statutory challenges to
the Treasury regulations. First, they argued that the 1978 congres-
sional amendments to the Passport Act barring the use of area re-
strictions in American passports evinced a congressional intention
to permit freedom of travel in accordance with the Helsinki Ac-
cords and, thus, rendered the regulations invalid. Second, they ar-
gued that the restrictions on foreign trade contained in Section
5(b) of the TWEA had never been construed as applying to per-
sonal expenditures for food and lodging incident to personal travel.
Finally, they argued that congressional action in 1977 severely lim-
iting the Executive's power to restrict trade on the basis of a decla-
ration of national emergency rendered the regulations invalid be-
cause they had not been promulgated with the assent of Congress
in accordance with the newly enacted congressional requirements.
Recognizing that Congress had grandfathered all exercises of Exec-
utive authority in effect on July 1, 1977, the Regan challengers ar-
gued that President Carter had lifted all travel restrictions to Cuba
on March 9, 1977, thus removing the Cuban travel ban from the
grandfather provision.
The Treasury regulations initially were invalidated by both the
First and Eleventh Circuits on the ground that bans on travel to
187. President's News Conference of March 9, 1977, 13 Weekly Comp. Pres. Doc. 328-29
(March 14, 1977).
188. The 1978 Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Pub. L. 95-426, § 124; 92 Stat. 971
(now codified at 22 U.S.C. § 211(a) (1982)); see also S. Rep. 842, 95th Cong., 2d. Sess. 14
(1978).
189. 31 C.F.R. § 515.201(b) (1985). From 1977 to 1982, expenses incident to personal
travel were exempted from 201(b) coverage. 31 C.F.R. § 515.560, 42 Fed. Reg. 16621 (1977).
The general license was removed by President Reagan in 1982. 47 Fed. Reg. 17030 (1982).
190. 104 S. Ct. 3026 (1984).
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Cuba did not fall within Congress' grandfather provision. 9' The
Supreme Court reversed, holding that because some trade with
Cuba still was embargoed on July 1, 1977,192 the Executive's gen-
eral power to extend the embargo to other forms of trade fell
within Congress' grandfather authority.193
Whatever the correctness of the Court's broad reading of the
grandfather clause and the Court's rejection of the challengers'
other two statutory theories, the closeness of the question cannot
be disputed. Two courts of appeals and four dissenting Supreme
Court justices accepted the challengers' statutory position. Close
questions of statutory construction normally are resolved in favor
of the first amendment. Regan proceeds on the opposite assump-
tion. The decision thus represents a paradigmatic example of the
Court's recent reluctance to apply process-based techniques rou-
tinely utilized to preserve first amendment values in other contexts
to cases involving the flow of ideas across the national border.
Undoubtedly, the Court's answer to this criticism would be that
the first amendment values implicated by the travel restrictions in
Regan were minimal at best.194 The manner in which the Court
reached that conclusion is itself highly suspect. First, the Court
characterized international travel as a mere "freedom" rather than
a "right," without explaining either the source or the significance
of this hierarchy of values. 195 Second, the Court described the re-
striction on travel as merely incidental to a valid governmental in-
191. Wald v. Regan, 708 F.2d 794 (1983); United States v. Frade, 709 F.2d 1387 (11th Cir.
1983).
192. 31 C.F.R. § 515.201(b) (1985). The grant of a general license under Regulation 560
exempting travel from subsection 201(b) was deemed by the Court to itself be an exercise or
regulatory authority.
193. Regan, 104 S. Ct. at 3038-39.
194. Id. at 3038 n.25.
195. The "right-freedom" semantic dichotomy is derived from Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280,
306 (1981), and Califano v. Aznavorian, 439 U.S. 170, 176-77 (1978). The Court, quoting
Zachariah Chafee, displayed a very different attitude in Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116 (1958):
An American who has crossed the ocean is not obliged to form his opinion
about our foreign policy merely from what he is told by officials of our govern-
ment or by a few correspondents of American newspaper .... In many differ-
ent ways, direct contact with other countries contributes to sounder discus-
sions at home.
Id. at 127 (quoting Z. CHAFEE, THREE HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE CONSTITUTION OF 1787, at 195-96
(1956)).
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terest in denying Cuba access to American dollars without ever ex-
amining whether the restriction was necessary to further that
governmental interest.196 Specifically, the Court in Regan declined
to weigh the impact of the regulation against the actual dollar im-
pact of recreational travel to Cuba.197 At the time of the litigation,
no more than eight million dollars annually were expended by
Americans travelling to Cuba,'98 a sum dwarfed by the hundreds of
millions of dollars in trade with Cuba by multinational affiliates of
American corporations. 199 The relatively minor sum of American
travel dollars could not possibly affect the Cuban economy in any
meaningful manner, giving rise to a strong suspicion that the regu-
lations were intended to cut off travel rather than dollars. Never-
theless, the Court steadfastly looked the other way and approved
the ban. If Regan is a harbinger of the future, a legal challenge to
other cynical attempts to use the national border as a censorship
device may prove extremely difficult.
PostRegan activity in the forbidden travel zone has centered on
government attempts to investigate scholars and professionals
travelling to Cuba within existing TWEA exemptions.0 0 Subpoe-
nas have been issued to lawyers and scholars travelling to Cuba,
and to persons arranging the trips, requiring detailed itineraries to
assure that the travellers are actually engaged in research, not
tourism.20'
Similarly, evidence is mounting of a government campaign to
harass and intimidate Americans travelling to Nicaragua, which
presently is not covered by a travel ban. 2 The FBI admits to in-
terviewing 100 such travelers upon their return; others put the
196. Regan, 104 S. Ct. at 3038-39.
197. Id.
198. Declaration of Hal Mayerson in Regan, 104 S. Ct. 3026 (1984). This account does not
include money spent by Cuban nationals, who were exempt from the travel ban under the
regulation. See 32 C.F.R. § 515.560(a)(1) (1985).
199. Id.
200. 31 C.F.R. § 515.560(a)(1) (1977).
201. See N.Y. Times, Sept. 17, 1984, at A4.
202. On May 1, 1985, however, the President imposed an embargo on trade with Nicara-
gua, pursuant to IEEPA, citing the "extraordinary threat" posed by Nicaragua "to the na-
tional security and foreign policy of the United States." Exec. Order No. 12,513, 50 Fed.
Reg. 18629 (1985). The embargo forbids the exchange of all goods and services with Nicara-
gua, except for "those destined for the organized democratic resistance."
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number much higher.2 °3 In addition, some travellers to Nicaragua
have complained that their taxes were audited and their mail in-
terrupted soon after their trips. The government denies all of these
charges.2 04
D. Limitations on the Dissemination of Books and Films In the
Interest of a Foreign Principal
Much of the litigation over the scope of FARA involves the ques-
tion of who is a lobbyist on behalf of a foreign government. 20 5 Defi-
nitional questions aside, the requirement that foreign agents regis-
ter with the American government and disclose their principals is
relatively uncontroversial. When the statute is applied to persons
communicating directly with the general public, however, and not
merely to persons lobbying government officials, its scope and ef-
fect dramatically expand, and the constitutional questions it raises
dramatically increase.
In Viereck v. United States,0 6 the Supreme Court construed
FARA to exclude disseminations by a foreign agent made on his
own behalf and not on behalf of his foreign principal. Even with
this narrowing construction, the statute's potential reach is enor-
mous. For example, much of the nation's ethnic press retains close
ties with political and social groups abroad, and often presents
views in close harmony with those of foreign governments or pri-
vate groups. The point at which close cooperation between an eth-
nic newspaper and foreign subscribers or supporters ripens into an
agency relationship triggering FARA frequently is not clear. In
203. N.Y. Times, April 19, 1985, at B20.
204. Id.
205. See S. Rep. No. 875, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. (1964) (leading up to the 1966 Amend-
ments to FARA, Pub. L. No. 89-468, 80 Stat. 244 (1966)). See generally Rabinowitz v. Ken-
nedy, 376 U.S. 605 (1964); Attorney Gen. v. Covington & Burling, 411 F. Supp. (D.D.C.
1976), injunction denied, 440 F. Supp. 1117 (D.D.C. 1979); Liberian Services v. Levy, 75
Civ. 3133 (S.D.N.Y. 1976); Attorney Gen. v. United States - Japan Trade Council, Inc., 76
Civ. 1290 (S.D.N.Y. 1976); Attorney Gen. v. DGA Int'l, Nos. 75-2040, 75-2041 & 75-2042
(D.D.C. 1975); Attorney Gen. v. American-Chilean Council, No. 78-2379 (D.D.C. 1979); At-
torney Gen. v. Carter, No. 80-1735 (D.D.C. 1980). The unreported cases are helpfully sum-
marized in Pattison & Taylor, THE REGISTRATION OF FOREIGN AGENTS IN THE UNITED STATES:
A PRACTICAL AND LEGAL GUIDE (published by the District of Columbia Bar 1981).
206. 318 U.S. 236 (1943). Possibly, Viereck's narrow construction applies only to the
1938-1942 version of FARA. Id. at 237-38. The Justice Department appears content to fol-
low Viereck even as to post-1942 cases.
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contrast, the chilling effect of requiring a newspaper to register
with the government is obvious.20 7
The potential for censorship inherent in FARA turns principally
on the outcome of Block v. Smith,08 which challenged the govern-
ment's efforts to apply FARA to three Canadian films. 20 9 As with
most national border information cases, the plaintiffs in Block
challenged the statute's vagueness, the Executive's reading of the
statute, and the constitutionality of the action at issue.
The district court rejected the plaintiffs' challenge, holding that
branding the films as "foreign political propaganda" did not vest
their American distributors with article III standing to challenge
the label. The district court's standing analysis, however, appears
to have confused standing with a decision on the merits, because
by any measure of article III standing, the distributor of a film
suffers a cognizable injury-in-fact when the film is characterized as
foreign political propaganda, and when records are kept of the the-
aters and organizations exhibiting the films.
Assuming that distributors have standing, the most vulnerable
aspect of FARA would appear to be its reporting provisions, re-
quiring distributors to report the identities of groups and theaters
exhibiting covered films or receiving more than one hundred copies
of a book or newspaper.210 Whatever interest the government may
have in assuring that viewers and readers know the foreign source
of a film or book, the government appears to have no legitimate
interest in learning who is reading the books or exhibiting the
films. 211 Moreover, as with so many regulations in the national bor-
207. Thus, if the government is successful in requiring The Irish People to register as an
agent of the Irish Northern Aid Committee because of a close ideological relationship and
the purchase of advertising, much of the nation's ethnic press will be similarly vulnerable.
Attorney Gen. v. Irish Northern Aid Comm., 346 F. Supp. 1384 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd mem., 465
F.2d 1405 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1080 (1972).
208. No. 84-5318 (D.C. Cir.) (currently pending). Judge Richey's District Court opinion is
unreported and is set out in the Circuit Court appendix at JA 292-318.
209. The application of FARA to these films was preliminarily enjoined in Keene v.
Smith, No. S-83-287 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 7, 1983). To date, no further action has been taken in
that case.
210. 29 C.F.R. § 5.401 (1985) (requiring the use of Form OBD 69).
211. See generally Brown v. Socialist Workers Campaign Comm., 459 U.S. 87, 91-92
(1982); Gibson v. Florida Legislative Investigation Comm., 372 U.S. 539 (1963); Talley v.
California, 362 U.S. 60 (1960); NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958); see also Lamont v.
Postmaster Gen., 381 U.S. 301, 307 (1965).
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der-censorship area, the reporting requirement has no support in
the statute itself, but is the product of unilateral executive law-
making.212
Nor does the government have a legitimate interest in imposing
denigrating labels on books and films with which it disagrees.213
While a requirement of country-of-origin labeling might survive
first amendment scrutiny, no legitimate interest is served by the
government's imposition of a denigrating label on a book or a film,
especially in the absence of any procedural safeguards, and pursu-
ant to vague and overbroad criteria that invite discriminatory
application.214
E. Denying Passports to Dissidents Because of Speech
Faced with Phillip Agee's persistent attempts to hamper the CIA
by disclosing the identities of its covert agents in foreign countries,
and limited by the lack of any available criminal sanctions cover-
ing Agee's activities, in 1979 the Secretary of State invoked regula-
tions authorizing the revocation of Agee's passport for activities
likely to have a seriously damaging effect on foreign policy or na-
tional security.215
Agee challenged the revocation, arguing that the Passport Act
did not authorize revocation or denial of a passport as a punish-
ment for speech harmful to foreign policy. Both the United States
District Court for the District of Columbia21 6 and the United
States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia 217 agreed,
holding that the statutory language did not expressly authorize the
revocation of Agee's passport, and that Congress did not acquiesce
in the exercise of such authority. The Supreme Court reversed,
finding the Executive's occasional assertion, without congressional
212. The reporting requirement flows from OBD 69, which requires the disclosure of the
names of persons receiving 100 copies of any book and the identities of any theater or or-
ganization showing a film. The use of Form OBD 69 is required by 28 C.F.R. § 5.401 (1985).
Disclosure of the identities of recipients is nowhere discussed in the statute itself.
213. Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123 (1951).
214. One district court recently issued an injunction against FARA's use of the political
propaganda label on precisely these grounds. Keene v. Meese, No. Civ. S.-83-287 (E.D. Cal.
Sept. 12, 1985). See generally Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566 (1974).
215. See Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 282-87 (1981).
216. Agee v. Vance, 483 F. Supp. 729 (D.D.C. 1980).
217. Agee v. Muskie, 629 F.2d 80 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
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demurrer, of the power to revoke a passport, sufficient grounds for
inferring congressional acquiescence.218 The Court's struggle to dis-
til congressional acquiescence from the equivocal record in Agee is
unprecedented in any other first amendment context. Moreover,
the Court declined to apply facial overbreadth or vagueness doc-
trines, noting that Agee's conduct was within the hard core of un-
protected activity, and leaving for another day the precise limits, if
any, on the Secretary's power.219
Agee is less disturbing for its precise holding than for its poten-
tial scope. Given the life-threatening nature of Agee's activity,
whether his speech fell within the protection of the first amend-
ment is debatable. Agee narrowly stands, therefore, for the un-
remarkable principle that a passport can be revoked because of un-
protected activity that threatens the life of American officials
abroad.220 But both the wording of the Secretary's regulation,221
and the overheated language of the Agee opinion,22 go far beyond
the facts of the case. Under the terms of the regulation, no distinc-
tion is made between protected and unprotected speech. Further,
no attempt is made to define the required injury in terms of a
threat to life or personal safety. Instead, "serious damage" to "for-
eign policy" suffices. Accordingly, an American who speaks in Nic-
aragua or El Salvador condemning American foreign policy, or ral-
lies support in Europe for antinuclear policies, no longer can
assume that his passport is safe from revocation. While Aptheker
strongly suggests that a passport revocation based on protected ac-
tivity would be unconstitutional,223 after Agee, the outcome is no
longer so certain. Finally, as with many overbroad regulations af-
218. Haig, 453 U.S. at 301-03.
219. Id. at 309 n.61.
220. For purposes of the case, Agee conceded "any charge [the Government] wants to
make," including the charge that Agee's activities were causing serious damage to the na-
tional security. Id. at 287 n.11.
221. 22 C.F.R. § 51.70(b)(4) (1985) authorizes the revocation of a passport if "the Secre-
tary determines that the national's activities abroad are causing or are likely to cause seri-
ous damage to the national security or the foreign policy of the United States."
222. Agee's activities precipitated predictably strong language from the Court. 453 U.S. at
308-09. As Justice Brennan noted in dissent, "this case is a prime example of the adage that
'bad facts make bad laws."' Id. at 319 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
223. Aptheker v. United States, 378 U.S. 500 (1964). The Court appears to read Aptheker
as forbidding passport denials on ideological gounds. Regan v. Wald, 104 S. Ct. 3026, 3038
(1984).
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fecting speech, the regulation's actual application probably is less
significant than the self-censorship its overbreadth induces in
speakers not wishing to risk passport revocation.
F. Limits on Teaching Foreign Students and Speaking Before In-
ternational Audiences
Many educational institutions have refused to comply with the
government's attempt to regulate the teaching of foreign students
under the rubric of export control. No court has yet ruled on the
practice.2 24 As the current UCLA catalogue attests,22 5 however, the
government's warnings may well have encouraged some American
academics to exclude foreign students from certain courses.
The government's efforts to limit the presentation or publication
of scientific research data have been far more successful. When a
researcher depends upon government financial support, conces-
sions on publication or presentation as a condition of the research
grant are relatively easy to exact. While some universities, notably
Harvard and Stanford, have refused to conduct research under
such conditions,226 undoubtedly schools and individuals exist
which are neither so scrupulous nor so prosperous. Moreover, even
if a researcher or university were willing to launch a legal challenge
to a coerced contractual provision providing for prepublication re-
view by the government, the Snepp227 principle would loom as an
immediate hurdle to obtaining relief. Snepp notwithstanding, we
believe that under current law government contracts imposed on
private scientists requiring prepublication review of unclassified re-
search would not survive first amendment scrutiny.
G. Inhibitions on the Exportation of Films
No case law exists discussing the USIA's refusal to certify films
224. See supra note 107 (response of the University of Minnesota).
225. See supra note 108.
226. See supra note 107.
227. Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 507 (1980). In Snepp, the Court enforced a contrac-
tual provision requiring CIA preclearance of material published by ex-agents.
While the Snepp contract might be upheld as a narrow, consensual arrangement involving
a handful of persons with access to highly classified data, attempts to expand Snepp to
cover situations where consent is a fiction, large numbers of persons are involved, and no
classified information is at stake, should fail.
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for duty-free export under the Beirut Agreement.22 8 Were such a
challenge to be brought, the usual issues would surface. The USIA
regulations bear little relation to the text of the Beirut Agreement,
and are inconsistent with its spirit.229 Moreover, the vagueness of
the regulations predictably has led to their ideological application,
with films denied certification solely because they portray Ameri-
can society in an unfavorable light.2 30 Finally, the overtly content-
based application of the certification machinery raises obvious sub-
stantive first amendment questions. Were ordinary principles of
first amendment review to be applied to the USIA system, it would
not survive. Under the extraordinarily deferential standard applied
by the Supreme Court in Agee, Kleindienst, and Regan, however,
the issue remains in doubt.
III. TOWARD A MORE EXTENSIVE JUDICIAL ROLE IN PROTECTING
THE FLOW OF IDEAS ACROSS OUR NATIONAL BORDER
Recent case law hardly encourages optimism about the prospects
for close judicial scrutiny of impediments to the flow of informa-
tion and ideas across the national border. Indeed, the trend proba-
bly points in the opposite direction. Nevertheless, the assumption
that present judicial attitudes are immutable, or that they even re-
flect a coherent legal theory, is mistaken.
As much as anything else, current case law illustrates a problem
of judicial perception. Courts, reluctant to interfere with the for-
eign policy judgments of elected officials, have not yet grown ac-
customed to viewing the issues raised by this Article in first
amendment terms. Accordingly, an approach is needed that en-
ables the courts to protect individual speech interests without in-
truding into areas more properly left to the political branches. The
doctrinal foundations for such an approach already exist. Indeed,
the fundamental postulates of our constitutional system compel a
more active judicial role in this field.
That courts are not the proper forum for foreign policy decisions
is undisputed. Lost in acceptance of this proposition is the notion
that courts are ideally suited, in fact uniquely placed, to fulfill two
228. See supra note 109.
229. See supra note 112.
230. See supra notes 113 & 114.
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equally critical responsibilities in a democratic society. First,
courts can and should ensure that those in charge of our foreign
policy remain politically accountable through open debate. Second,
courts properly may insist that the power to limit debate, if tolera-
ble at all, should not be vested in a single individual or, under our
system of checks and balances, in a single branch of government.
The advantage of this approach is that it places the courts in a
structural rather than a substantive role. Applying the first princi-
ple, courts are enforcing a vertical separation of powers between
the governors and the governed. Applying the second principle,
courts are enforcing a horizontal separation of powers among the
executive, legislative, and judicial branches. Most importantly, in
neither case is the judiciary determining the outcome of any policy
debate.
A. Content-Based Restrictions On Public Debate Are Inconsistent
with the First Amendment
That government officials may not place content-based limita-
tions on public debate lies at the very core of modern first amend-
ment theory.23 1 The explanation is obvious. Restricting debate
reduces pressure for change and inhibits the ability of the political
majority to determine its will, thereby undermining the legitimat-
ing feature of democratic government.
In Aptheker, a federal statute barring communists from ob-
taining American passports to travel abroad was struck down by
the Supreme Court for reasons closely allied with the prohibition
against content-based restrictions on speech.232 Similarly, in La-
mont, the Court invalidated a law that required American citizens
to register with the Post Office prior to receiving certain commu-
nist literature. 233 Both decisions implicitly and properly recognized
that content-based censorship poses the same danger to demo-
cratic decisionmaking whether or not the border is involved. More-
over, the institutional competence of the judiciary to identify and
invalidate content-based limits on public debate does not depend
231. Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minnesota Comm'r of Revenue, 460 U.S. 575
(1983); Police Dep't of the City Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92 (1972).
232. Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500, 513-14 (1964).
233. See supra note 175 and accompanying text.
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on the issues being debated, or whether the national border is
crossed.
Ironically, the Court's opinion in Kleindienst often is cited as
evidence that the obligation of content neutrality does not apply to
visa denials and, by extension, to any decision affecting the flow of
information or ideas across the national border.2 34 In fact, the
Kleindienst decision can fairly be read as holding only that the
government's proffer of a content-neutral and plausible explana-
tion for barring Mandel enabled the Court to avoid traditional first
amendment analysis.23 5
Special expertise in diplomacy or war is not required to realize
that the first amendment forbids the banning of foreign speakers
based on their political associations or writings. Once the focus is
shifted from the foreign speaker, who has no first amendment
rights, to the American audience, which possesses full first amend-
ment rights, the issue of judicial capacity in national border cases
involving content-based censorship largely disappears.
To be meaningful, the doctrine of content neutrality cannot be
confined to those rare instances in which the government concedes
an ideological motive.236 Even where government censorship osten-
sibly is triggered by goals unrelated to speech or association-such
as the refusal to permit books, magazines, or people to travel to or
from Cuba under the TWEA-courts have a significant role to
play. As in other contexts where free speech values are at stake,
the judiciary must remain alert to the possibility that a neutral
reason for blocking speech is merely a pretext designed to shield
an unspoken content-based judgment.237 The judicial techniques
234. E.g., NGO Comm. on Disarmament v. Haig, No. 72 Civ. 3636 (S.D.N.Y. 1982), afi'd,
697 F.2d 294 (2d Cir. 1982). ("In the area of discretionary admission of excludable aliens
.. . the government may act for political reasons.")(slip op. at 7).
235. See supra note 146 and accompanying text.
236. See Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233 (1936). The difficulty of proving an
intent to suppress speech is discussed in Alfange, Free Speech and Symbolic Conduct: The
Draft-Card Burning Case, 1968 Sup. CT. REv. 1; Brest, Palmer v. Thompson: An Approach
to the Problem of Unconstitutional Legislative Motive, 1971 SUP. CT. REv. 95; Ely, Legisla-
tive and Administrative Motivation in Constitutional Law, 79 YALE L. J. 1205 (1970); see
also A. BicKFL, THE LRAST DANGERous BRANCH 208-21 (1962).
237. United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 382-86 (1968), upholds the government's
right to impose incidental restriction on speech if necessary to achieve a legitimate and non-
ideological state interest. The O'Brien test is not satisfied if the asserted interest is merely a
pretext masking ideological motives.
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for making this determination are reasonably uncontroversial. If an
ostensibly neutral standard is applied more harshly against one
category of speaker than against another, doubts about institu-
tional competence should not deter a court from piercing the pre-
text of neutral justification.
Similarly, requiring the government to establish a reasonable
correlation between means and ends is separate and distinct from
a judicial inquiry into the validity of the government's policy goals.
The courts need not, and should not, question the wisdom of a
trade embargo against Cuba in order to question the constitution-
ality of extending the embargo to interrupt the flow of information
and ideas between that country and ours. Absent a close nexus be-
tween means and ends, a court may fairly assume that the govern-
ment's motivation is related to the suppression of ideas.238 For ex-
ample, the efficacy of the embargo in Cuba, involving minor sums
used in purchasing books, magazines, and lodging is highly dubi-
ous. Conversely, the inability to purchase such items, and the ac-
companying exposure they bring to competing ideas and to a com-
peting political and social system, diminishes the ability of the
American public to evaluate the need for the trade embargo im-
posed on its behalf by elected officials.
The inquiry into means and ends cannot be divorced entirely
from substantive considerations. At what point a trade embargo is
imperiled by exempted transactions may be a matter of legitimate
dispute. Inevitably, grey areas will arise where the judgment of po-
litical officials must, and should be, accepted. In many other cases,
however, the issue will not be close and, faced with the necessity of
offering a public explanation, the government will either relent or
assert some other, noneconomic interest.
Typically, the other interest asserted by the government is the
need to convey its own symbolic message. For example, the govern-
ment has argued that any relaxation of a total trade embargo will
be perceived by the Cuban government as a weakening of Ameri-
can resolve. Alternatively, the government has sometimes main-
tained that a calculated "disinformation" campaign orchestrated
238. See Neuborne, A Rationale for Protecting and Regulating Commercial Speech, 46
BRoOKLYN L. REV. 437 (1980).
[Vol. 26:719
THE NYLON CURTAIN
by a hostile nation can undermine American foreign policy.2 39
These arguments are difficult to accept in a system based on the
premise that the answer to allegedly false speech is more speech,
not suppression. Similarly, no support exists in either constitu-
tional or democratic theory for the claim that the government's
own speech interests outweigh the speech interests of its
citizens.240
Occasionally, the Court has relied on the theory that the first
amendment protects only the right to speak, and not the right to
obtain information from any source at any time. 4 1 The right to
obtain information from an unwilling source is, of course, not the
issue. Rather, the issue is whether the government may interpose
the national border as a communications barrier between a willing
speaker and a willing listener. When the government impedes or
diverts that communication stream, it strikes at the very heart of
the first amendment. When the government does so ideologically,
distorting public debate in favor of its own policies, the courts be-
come an entirely appropriate forum for probing the government's
asserted justification.
Sometimes this process of judicial inquiry may compel a first
amendment exception to an otherwise comprehensive licensing
scheme. That outcome should neither disturb nor surprise us. For
example, the government may license street vendors,4 2 but not
street preachers.24 3 Moreover, the religious values enshrined in the
first amendment often require the government to make accommo-
dations in otherwise lawful government programs.4 What is
unique and constitutionally unjustified about recent national bor-
der-censorship cases is the judicial willingness to grant the execu-
239. For example, in NGO Comm. on Disarmament v. Haig, No. 72 Civ. 3636 (S.D.N.Y.
1982), the government argued that the Japanese delegates barred from attending the United
Nations Second Special Session on Disarmament in New York City belonged to a Japanese
disarmament group affiliated with the World Peace Council, which the government de-
scribed as a front for Soviet propaganda.
240. See M. YUDOF, WHEN GovERNmNT SPEAKs (1980).
241. Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1965).
242. City of New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297 (1976).
243. E.g., Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444 (1938).
244. E.g., Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707 (1982); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205
(1972); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963); see also Quaring v. Peterson, 728 F.2d 1121
(8th Cir. 1984), cert. granted, 53 U.S.L.W. 3235 (U.S. Oct. 1, 1984).
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tive branch the right to determine with virtually unfettered au-
thority what information and ideas Americans may receive from
other countries.
B. Procedural Techniques for Protecting First Amendment Values
in National Border Settings
American judges have evolved at least five sets of process-based
doctrines designed to insulate first amendment values from
majoritarian erosion. The clear statement doctrine requires an ex-
plicit manifestation of congressional intent to encroach on first
amendment values.2 45 The void for vagueness doctrine requires
that statutes or regulations impinging on significant constitutional
values, especially first amendment values, be drafted with a degree
of precision to assure that uncontrolled discretion is not vested in
enforcement officials. 246 The overbreadth doctrine requires statutes
or regulations impinging on free speech to distinguish between pro-
tected and unprotected activity.2 47 The delegation doctrine prohib-
its Congress from vesting enforcement officials with excessive dis-
cretion, especially when first amendment interests are at stake. 4 s
Finally, the ban on standardless permit systems forbids officials
from exercising undue discretion about who is to be permitted to
speak.249
Each of these procedural techniques has a common prophylactic
core-an insistence upon precise legislative articulation of the
ground rules under which free speech may be suppressed. This
core assures, first, that enforcement officials will not substitute
subjective, content-related criteria in deciding who may speak;
and, second, ensures meaningful judicial review to ensure compli-
ance with the ground rules. These procedural techniques also have
a common root in classic separation of powers doctrine. Viewed
functionally, these techniques assure that the executive branch im-
plements only what the legislative branch has decreed.
Domestically, these allocative principles are essentially undis-
245. See supra note 122.
246. See supra note 119.
247. See supra note 120.
248. See supra note 123.
249. See supra note 121.
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puted. A serious question arises, however, concerning their applica-
bility in national border settings involving foreign affairs and mili-
tary security. Unlike domestic situations where the classic
tripartite separation of powers model is operative,2 50 national bor-
der cases often involve the exercise of powers granted by the Con-
stitution jointly to the Executive and to Congress, without regard
to the classic separation of powers model. When the President ex-
ercises the foreign affairs power, his coequal status with Congress
differs from his derivative role in domestic affairs. To the extent
that procedural techniques like delegation and vagueness are
designed to reinforce the primary lawmaking role of Congress, and
to ensure the derivative role of the Executive in the classic separa-
tion of powers scheme, they are less obviously applicable in na-
tional border cases because it is no longer clear that the Executive
should be kept on a tight rein.
Accordingly, the Court has shown far less concern about separa-
tion of powers principles in foreign affairs cases if convinced that
the Executive and the Congress are acting in support of a common
political vision. Thus, in United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export
Co., 251 the Court upheld a criminal conviction for selling arms to
Bolivia, triggered by a presidential certification that the sale of
such arms would endanger peace in the area. More recently, in
Dames & Moore v. Regan,252 the Court upheld President Carter's
authority to issue executive orders overriding judicial attachments
of Iranian funds and transferring outstanding claims against Iran
to an International Tribunal as part of the agreement freeing
250. A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Co. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935); Panama Refining
Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935).
251. 299 U.S. 304 (1936). In Curtiss-Wright, a joint resolution of Congress conditionally
forbade arms sales to participants in the Chaco dispute between Bolivia and Paraguay if the
President certified that such a ban would contribute to reestablishing peace in the area. The
President forbade the sales from 1934-1935. Curtiss-Wright was indicted for selling guns to
Bolivia during the embargo and defended on the ground that the joint resolution delegated
excessive discretion to the Executive.
The Joint Resolution utilized in Curtiss-Wright to signify congressional approval would
probably not satisfy the criteria set forth in Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. Chadha,
103 S. Ct. 2764 (1983), to measure the proper exercise of article I power.
Whether a crime can be created by a Joint Resolution, as opposed to the formal article I
legislative process, was, apparently, not considered in Curtiss-Wright. The Joint Resolution
in Curtiss-Wright is set out in Chap. 365, 48 Stat. 811 (1934).
252. 453 U.S. 654 (1981).
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Americans held hostage in Teheran. The decision in Dames &
Moore is particularly revealing because evidence of formal legisla-
tive authorization for the transfer of claims from American courts
was minimal. 53 Yet, given the fact that the branches were exercis-
ing a shared constitutional power, the Court's focus upon the exis-
tence of an apparent political agreement between the branches
seems appropriate.5 4
If the Supreme Court is correct in holding that procedural tech-
niques rooted in classic separation of powers doctrine have little or
no role in foreign affairs cases like Curtiss-Wright and Dames &
Moore, why should they have any applicability in national border-
censorship cases? The current Supreme Court seems to think they
should not have any applicability. The Court's approach in Haig v.
Agee and Regan v. Wald is, from a separation of powers stand-
point, indistinguishable from Curtiss-Wright or Dames & Moore.
In both Agee and Regan, the Court ignored serious separation of
powers weaknesses in the Executive's purported authority and
strained to find legislative sanction not readily apparent in either
case. The Court was wrong in both instances. What differentiates
Curtiss-Wright and Dames & Moore from national border-censor-
ship cases is the threat to first amendment values posed by the
latter. When no substantive constitutional values are endangered,
as in Curtiss-Wright or Dames & Moore, strict enforcement of sep-
aration of powers norms is an unnecessary impediment to the effi-
cient functioning of a shared foreign relations power. When first
amendment values are at stake, however, respect for separation of
powers doctrine is necessary, not to enforce a functional allocation
of responsibility between Congress and the President, but to fulfill
the other great task of separation of powers-the prevention of un-
due concentrations of power in the hands of a single set of officials
under conditions that threaten substantive constitutional values.2 55
Treating national border-censorship cases identically with for-
253. Authorization for the vacation of attachments was found in a straightforward way by
broadly construing the President's power under IEEPA. Id. at 669-74.
The Court conceded that no statute authorized claims transfer, but upheld it because
Congress had acquiesced in analogous activity. Id. at 675. Dames & Moore is the farthest
afield the Supreme Court has ever gone to find legislative authorization for executive action.
254. Id. at 674.
255. See Neuborne, supra note 131, at 372.
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eign affairs cases that do not implicate substantive constitutional
values overlooks the two significant roles that the separation of
powers doctrine plays in our system. On a functional level, separa-
tion of powers doctrine directs governmental decisions to the insti-
tutions considered most likely by the Founders to perform them
effectively.2 56 The paradigm example of functional separation of
powers is the vesting of domestic lawmaking authority in a large
representative body, the Congress, which is capable of reflecting
the degree of compromise and interest-balancing necessary to
make law in a democracy, while vesting the task of enforcing the
law in a single official, the President, capable of swift and decisive
action. Given the Founders' decision to blur the lines of authority
between Congress and the President in the foreign affairs and mili-
tary security spheres, the functional aspect of separation of powers
assume a diminished role in those areas, at least when the two
branches are not in disagreement.
The stakes change, however, when substantive values of consti-
tutional magnitude, especially first amendment values, are impli-
cated by congressional or presidential action. Under those circum-
stances, separation of powers plays an even more significant role
by assuring that the power to override important constitutional
values is not concentrated in the hands of a single group of inter-
ested officials.257 This prophylactic aspect of separation of powers
doctrine, described elsewhere as "negative" separation,68 is
designed to preserve liberty by introducing a degree of controlled
inefficiency into the governmental process whenever a value of con-
stitutional magnitude is threatened.
Negative or prophylactic separation of powers has served as a
fundamental structural guarantee of liberty for much of our Na-
tion's history. 59 It is dangerously wrong for the Supreme Court to
256. Id.
257. See supra note 121. These permit cases are prime examples of the refusal to permit
censorial power to be concentrated in a single set of officials.
258. Neuborne, supra note 131, at 372.
259. The historic concern with prophylactic separation of powers is illustrated by the pro-
hibition on common law crimes (preventing a fusion of power in the judiciary), see, e.g.,
United States v. Hudson & Goodwin, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch.) 32 (1812), and the prohibition on
Bills of Attainder (preventing a fusion of power in the Congress), see, e.g., United States v.
Brown, 381 U.S. 437 (1965); Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952)
(preventing a fusion of powers in the executive).
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ignore this guarantee in national border-censorship cases merely
because it may be inapplicable in those foreign affairs cases not
implicating constitutional values.260
Prior to Regan and Agee, the Supreme Court had shown some
recognition of this distinction. In Viereck,26 1 the Court was con-
fronted with two plausible readings of FARA and adopted the nar-
rower construction, exempting the individual writings of registered
foreign agents from the Act's dissemination controls. In Kent v.
Dulles,6 2 the Court refused to sustain the Executive's right to
deny passports to American communists based on the vague word-
The first amendment permit cases, the void for vagueness doctrine, the first amendment
due process cases and the clear statement cases are all examples of a sustained refusal to
permit an undue concentration of power to censor speech in the executive branch.
260. See DeArellano v. Weinberger, 745 F.2d 1500, 1515 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (en banc), va-
cated mem., 105 S. Ct. 2355 (1985) ("The executive's power to conduct foreign relations free
from the unwarranted supervision of the judiciary cannot give the executive carte blanche to
trample the most fundamental . . . rights of this country's citizenry.")
Even in Dames & Moore, the Court was careful to provide additional protection for sub-
stantive constitutional values. Confronted with an argument that President Carter's transfer
of pending judicial claims against Iran to an International Tribunal was an unconstitutional
seizure of property, the Court carefully refrained from rejecting the claim, noting that it was
premature because the international tribunal might well prove an effective forum and that,
in any event, should the tribunal's remedy prove illusory, the President's action would be
judicially reviewable in the Court of Claims. Dames & Moore, 453 U.S. at 689-90. If the
property rights of American creditors are entitled to meaningful judicial protection against
government seizure in the pursuit of foreign policy, surely the first amendment liberty rights
of Americans should receive a like degree of protection when the government overrides them
in the name of foreign policy.
261. Viereck v. United States, 318 U.S. 236, 245-46 (1943). In Viereck, the defendant, who
had registered as an agent of a German newspaper and an organ of the German government
in 1940, was charged with failing to report that he had operated a publishing house and
supplied members of Congress with information and speeches. The defendant argued that
because the unreported activities were on his own behalf, they did not fall within the stat-
ute, even though the regulations required disclosure of all activities. The Court divided, with
Chief Justice Stone narrowly reading the statute for a five person majority and Justices
Black and Douglas arguing for a broad reading. Justices Jackson and Reed did not
participate.
262. 357 U.S. 116 (1958). In Kent, the Secretary refused to issue a passport to Rockwell
Kent until he swore that he was not a member of the Communist Party and was not going
abroad to advance the Communist movement. Id. at 117, n.1. Justice Douglas wrote for a
majority of five, stating- "[w]here activities or enjoyment, natural and often necessary to the
well-being of an American citizen, such as travel, are involved, we will construe narrowly all
delegated powers that curtail or dilute them." Id. at 129. Whether Justice Douglas' opinion
in Kent can be squared with his dissent in Viereck is doubtful.
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ing of a 1926 statute. And in Laub, 63 the Court declined to find
congressional authorization for criminal prosecutions of persons
travelling to and from Cuba in violation of an area restriction con-
tained in the passport. Agee and Regan plainly reflect a very dif-
ferent judicial philosophy.
Most attempts at censorship follow a common pattern; speech is
to be prevented, not because it is intrinsically harmful, but because
the speech itself, or the failure to take the government action
which prevents the speech, allegedly will lead to an evil which the
government has the duty or, at least, the power to prevent. Four
fundamental questions are raised in any such process: first, how
grave must the threatened evil be to justify suppression of the
speech; second, how likely must it be that permitting the speech
will result in the threatened evil; third, is it really necessary to
block the speech to avoid the threatened evil; and, finally, who gets
to answer questions one, two, and three?
When the person called upon to answer questions one, two, or
three is a bureaucrat closely tied to the execution of the policy or
program in question, an understandable danger exists that the offi-
cial will deflect error on the side of his or her program or policy,
treating each speech-created impediment as a grave evil and each
risk as a foregone conclusion. For example, were we to delegate ul-
timate responsibility for deciding whether to permit leafletting in
parks to the Commissioner of Sanitation, we would risk an answer
which equated litter with original sin and leafletters with Mephis-
topheles. Such an understandable tendency toward bureaucratic
tunnel vision would risk substantial, and unnecessary, overdeter-
rence of free expression.264
263. In United States v. Laub, 385 U.S. 475 (1967), the government sought to utilize 8
U.S.C. § 1185(b) as the basis for criminally prosecuting persons who arranged travel for
Americans to Cuba in defiance of the area controls for passports upheld in Zemel v. Rusk,
381 U.S. 1 (1965). Section 1185(b) provided, in relevant part, "it shall. . . be unlawful for
any citizen of the United States to depart from or enter, or attempt to depart from or enter,
the United States, unless he bears a valid passport." Justice Fortas, writing for a unanimous
Court, ruled that persons travelling to Cuba did not violate section 1185(b) because they
possessed valid passports at the times they crossed the American border and, thus complied
with the statute's literal terms. Laub, therefore, rendered the area restrictions upheld in
Zemel virtually unenforceable.
264. "Because the censor's business is to censor, there inheres the danger that he may
well be less responsive than a court-part of an independent branch of government-to the
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One way of dealing with the problem is to be serious about en-
forcing prophylactic separation of powers doctrines that effectively
preclude self-interested bureaucracies from overdeterring speech in
the quest for enhanced efficiency. If both the City Council and the
Commissioner of Sanitation must make the rules about leafletting
in the parks, a degree of objectivity is imposed that insulates ex-
pression. To ensure that decisions about suppressing speech in na-
tional border contexts are not made by well-meaning bureaucrats
afflicted with tunnel vision, the Supreme Court should return to its
earlier practice of enforcing procedural techniques like the vague-
ness, delegation, and standardless permit doctrines in the context
of national border-censorship cases.
CONCLUSION
Shi Huang Ti is known as the First Emperor of China. His reign,
which lasted from 221-210 B.C., is remembered today for two re-
markable initiatives: he began construction of the Great Wall to
shield his country from foreign armies and he banned all books to
shield his country from foreign ideas. This unhappy policy reflects
a pattern that has persisted for two thousand years. For those
wielding power, the tendency to view censorship as an instrument
of security often is irresistible. For judges reviewing the sort of
censorial decisions described in this Article, the pressure to defer
to the security judgments of political officials frequently is
overwhelming.
The march of technology has made the world an increasingly
small and interrelated place. International travel now occurs with a
speed and ease that would have been unthinkable only a few de-
cades ago. Multinational corporations depend daily on the interna-
tional exchange of information through elaborate computer net-
works. The notion that freedom of movement across national
borders should not be constrained by political considerations has
become a human rights benchmark by which countries are rou-
tinely and properly judged.
The difficult constitutional issues raised by the international ex-
change of information and the international movement of individu-
constitutionally protected interests in free expression." Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51,
57-58 (1965).
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als have, nevertheless, received very little attention in American
legal literature. There are relatively few reported decisions and
fewer academic commentaries. Moreover, what analysis exists is al-
most entirely ad hoc. No consistent doctrine has emerged to recon-
cile sovereign control of the borders with our national commitment
to free speech and debate. Indeed, despite sixty-five years of first
amendment jurisprudence, the law in the national border-censor-
ship area resembles the early free speech cases of the 1920's, when
free speech interests were typically acknowledged, even applauded,
but rarely upheld. Surely we can do better.
